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Original Meaning and the  
Precedent Fallback 
Randy J. Kozel* 
There is longstanding tension between originalism and judicial 
precedent. With its resolute focus on deciphering the enacted Constitution, the 
originalist methodology raises questions about whether judges can legitimately 
defer to their own pronouncements. Numerous scholars have responded by 
debating whether and when the Constitution’s original meaning should yield to 
contrary precedent. 
This Article considers the role of judicial precedent not when it conflicts 
with the Constitution’s original meaning but rather when the consultation of 
text and historical evidence is insufficient to resolve a case. In those situations, 
deference to precedent can serve as a fallback rule of constitutional 
adjudication. The strengths and weaknesses of the originalist methodology take 
on a unique valence when a primary commitment to original meaning is 
coupled with a fallback rule of deference to precedent. Even when the 
Constitution’s original meaning leaves multiple options available, falling back 
on precedent can channel judicial discretion and contribute to a stable, 
impersonal framework of constitutional law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The status of judicial precedent has posed a conceptual challenge 
for originalism. On some accounts, the originalist methodology leaves 
little room for fidelity to the pronouncements of prior courts.1 After all, 
how can a theory that is motivated by the primacy of text and historical 
understandings permit deference to judicial gloss?2 
 
 1.  See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD 
CONSTITUTION 154 (2013) (“Originalism is often thought, by both its advocates and its critics, to 
be inconsistent with precedent.”); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse 
Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1473 (2007) (describing the claim that originalists face “an 
unpleasant choice: either take a principled stance with such dire implications for the rule of law 
that it endangers originalism as a viable theory of interpretation, or apply an inconsistent and 
unprincipled stare decisis”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 767 (1988) (“[T]he central problem for originalism is whether 
the cost of embracing stare decisis is too high—whether, in the end, the embrace destroys 
originalism’s bedrock assumption that, until formally amended, the Constitution establishes a 
permanent ordering binding on all organs of the government, including the courts.”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Rebel Without a Clause: The Irrelevance of Article VI to 
Constitutional Supremacy, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 38 (2011) (“The ‘judicial 
Power’ is the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law. If the Constitution conflicts 
with any other potentially applicable source of law, such as statutes or prior judicial 
decisions . . . , the Constitution must prevail.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically 
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (“If one is an 
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The apparent tension between originalism and precedent has 
elicited a robust scholarly response. Recent years have witnessed 
notable attempts to demonstrate that adherence to precedent, even 
flawed precedent, is compatible with a commitment to the 
Constitution’s original meaning under certain circumstances.3 
According to these arguments, precedent is not simply a conceptual 
obstacle that justifies an exception to originalism for the sake of 
practicality.4 Rather, precedent can function as an intrinsic and 
coherent part of originalist theory. 
Scholarly treatments of the operation of precedent within 
originalism commonly feature situations of conflict between judicial 
case law and the Constitution’s original meaning.5 This emphasis is 
understandable, for it reflects the importance of determining whether 
originalism can accommodate widely lauded precedents even if they 
represent deviations from the originalist Constitution.6 Yet there is 
another set of questions relating to cases in which the Constitution’s 
original meaning is uncertain. For example: How should courts respond 
if the Constitution’s text, structure, and historical context leave 
substantial doubt about whether corporate electioneering is part of the 
 
originalist . . . then stare decisis, understood as a theory of adhering to prior judicial precedents 
that are contrary to the original public meaning, is completely irreconcilable with originalism.”).  
 3.  See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 177–78 (“[W]hen an existing 
precedent conflicts with the original meaning, an intermediate approach that sometimes follows 
original meaning and sometimes follows precedent is best.”); Lash, supra note 1, at 1441–42 (“A 
theory of stare decisis that takes into account the majoritarian commitment of popular sovereignty 
may justify upholding an erroneous precedent, depending on the costs imposed on the majoritarian 
political process.”); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2011) (“[T]he justices may—in limited situations—use wrongly decided constitutional 
precedents as rules of decision without betraying their allegiance to the enacted constitutional 
text.”); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, 
and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 420 (2006) (“[A] limited respect is due some 
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent because of the larger societal and constitutional goal of 
effectively pursuing the common good.”). 
 4.  Contra ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
139 (1997) (“The whole function of the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is 
false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”); 
Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2006) 
(“Rather than embracing precedent as critical to the rule of law, [Justice Scalia] views it as an 
obstacle to correct constitutional interpretation.”). 
 5.  “Often,” but not “invariably.” Among the most notable exceptions is Caleb Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). See infra Part V. For an 
overview of several approaches to conflicts between precedent and original meaning, see Randy J. 
Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 
1870–73 (2013).  
 6.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 158 (1990) (“[I]t is too late to overrule not only the decision legalizing paper money but 
also those decisions validating certain New Deal and Great Society programs pursuant to the 
congressional powers over commerce, taxation, and spending.”). 
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“freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment?7 What if there 
is insufficient evidence to determine whether the “right . . . to keep and 
bear Arms” applies to individuals?8 Or if there is no reliable way to 
figure out the application of the jury-trial right to the imposition of 
mandatory-minimum sentences?9 In situations like these, is there a 
meaningful role for judicial precedent to play? It is this aspect of the 
relationship between originalism and stare decisis that I wish to 
consider: the function of precedent when the Constitution’s original 
meaning cannot confidently be discerned.10 
Focusing on situations of constitutional uncertainty underscores 
the fact that deference to precedent need not come at the expense of 
respecting the Constitution’s original meaning.11 Evidence of original 
meaning will sometimes be inadequate to provide a clear answer to a 
disputed question.12 Moreover, vague constitutional terms, even when 
understood in historical context, will sometimes permit a range of 
outcomes. I suggest that in such situations, originalists may consider 
stare decisis as a fallback rule. Upon finding that the Constitution’s 
original meaning is insufficient to resolve a dispute, courts can adopt a 
presumption of deference to judicial precedent. Such a fallback rule is 
compatible with several (though not all) prominent versions of 
originalism. Whether one’s commitment to originalism is grounded in 
the rule of law, consequentialism, or popular sovereignty, deferring to 
precedent is a coherent response to constitutional uncertainty.13 
From a normative perspective, this precedent fallback has much 
to recommend it. Asking judges to defer to the pronouncements of their 
predecessors can be a useful mechanism of judicial constraint, which is 
 
 7.  The example is drawn from Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 8.  The example is drawn from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 9.  The example is drawn from Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 10.  This Article uses the term “stare decisis” in the general sense of “[f]idelity to precedent.” 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 377 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).  
 11.  Cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1 at 185 (“When the original meaning is 
uncertain, a far stronger argument exists for following precedent—provided that the precedent 
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the original meaning—than when the precedent clearly 
conflicts with the original meaning.”). 
 12.  My claims are intended to apply equally to (a) original meaning as defined in terms of 
the original intentions of some relevant set of constitutional framers and ratifiers and (b) original 
meaning as defined by the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text at the time of 
ratification. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. 
U. L. REV. 923, 926–34 (2009) (summarizing the competing approaches). I take no position 
regarding which definition of original meaning is superior. Further, my focus on situations of 
constitutional uncertainty makes the distinction less salient. Cf. Nelson, supra note 5, at 557 
(contending that “in the very cases where divisions among the framers and ratifiers make the 
‘original intention’ indeterminate, the ‘original meaning’ is likely to be similarly indeterminate”).  
 13.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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a value that many originalists have long prized.14 To some critics of 
originalism, the constraint argument is “naïve” due to the 
“fragmentariness and contestability of the historical record.”15 A related 
challenge has arisen within the originalist school itself. The source of 
the challenge is the movement to distinguish between the interpretation 
of the Constitution’s linguistic meaning and the construction of 
constitutional law. Decoupling the steps of interpretation and 
construction implies that within the “construction zone,”16 there can be 
a range of outcomes from which a judge must select on some basis other 
than the semantic meaning of constitutional text.17 In the view of one 
recent commentator, “[t]he very changes that make” the construction-
based approach “theoretically defensible also strip it of any pretense of 
a power to constrain judges to a meaningful degree.”18 
Fidelity to judicial precedent responds to both lines of criticism. 
When the implications of constitutional text and historical evidence are 
uncertain, judges need not receive license to decide cases according to 
their subjective intuitions. A primary commitment to original meaning 
can be coupled with a secondary preference for judicial precedent, 
including nonoriginalist precedent. Stare decisis becomes a 
 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009); see also Eric 
Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331 (2013) (“Whatever its 
merits . . . originalism often cannot fulfill its promises of fixation and constraint.”); Thomas B. 
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 723 (2011) (recounting the criticism 
that “it is often impossible to determine the actual original understanding of a particular 
constitutional provision . . . because the historical record is contradictory, incomplete, or severely 
compromised” (footnotes omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
2011, 2015 (2012) (describing originalism as harboring “pretensions of objectivity and 
determinacy”); David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 969, 970 (2008) (“[O]riginalism, contrary to appearances, in fact imposes only a very 
uncertain limit on judges and leaves them a great deal of latitude to find, in the original 
understandings, the outcomes they want to find.”). 
 16.  Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
95, 108 (2010). 
 17.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional 
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1509 (2012) (arguing that “the originalist construction school . . . permits the 
very results that originalism was designed to avoid—namely, the unrestrained judicial trumping 
of democratically authorized decision making and the implementation of textual understandings 
of which those alive at the time of ratification would have been totally unaware.”); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 502–03 (2013) (“If 
one were attracted to originalism because one was opposed to unconstrained judicial discretion in 
constitutional cases, then the notion of a construction zone in which judicial decisions were 
unconstrained . . . would be worrisome.”). 
 18.  Colby, supra note 15, at 714; see also Dorf, supra note 15, at 2014 (“[N]ew originalists 
may rely on the relative open-endedness of original meaning in order to justify results that comport 
with their values.”). 
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supplemental constraint on judges when the Constitution’s original 
meaning is in doubt. 
Falling back on precedent can also contribute to the stability and 
impersonality of constitutional law. Once again, these are values that 
many originalists have embraced.19 A commitment to originalism 
coheres with skepticism about judicial updating of the Constitution.20 
When the original meaning is uncertain, deference to judicial precedent 
can reinforce a similar principle. Combining a primary commitment to 
original meaning with a precedent fallback promotes a conception of 
constitutional law as enduring over time and transcending the 
proclivities of individual jurists. Further, invoking precedent in 
response to uncertainty has a basis in America’s constitutional history: 
Leading scholars have contended that figures such as James Madison 
posited that uncertainties in the Constitution’s text would be 
“liquidated” through, among other things, the creation of judicial 
precedent.21 Against this backdrop, the case for falling back on 
precedent draws force from history as well as normative 
argumentation. 
For originalism’s proponents, the primary implication of this 
analysis is that the precedent fallback is worthy of consideration as a 
tool for enhancing the methodology’s effectiveness and appeal. For 
originalism’s critics, the analysis suggests that neither incompatibility 
with precedent nor inability to constrain is an inherent defect of 
originalist theory. Many versions of originalism are fully consistent 
with the precedent fallback. Or so I claim. 
What I do not claim (for present purposes) is that the precedent 
fallback is superior to other potential means of responding to 
constitutional uncertainty. Commentators have offered a variety of 
proposals for how judges should behave when the inquiry into the 
Constitution’s original meaning is inconclusive. The options include 
deferring to the political branches of government, protecting individual 
liberty, and consulting the methods by which the Founding generation 
expected judges to react to textual and contextual uncertainty.22 The 
respective arguments in favor of those positions are comprehensive (and 
insightful). My goal in this Article is far more modest: I hope to 
demonstrate that, within the originalist school, deference to precedent 
deserves consideration as a possible response to constitutional 
uncertainty. What I am after, in short, is a particular way of thinking 
 
 19.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  See infra Part VI.E. 
 22.  See infra Part VI.B. 
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about precedent—one that views precedent as a source of value rather 
than a conceptual obstacle that originalism must overcome or explain 
away.23 
Finally, though I return to the issue below, I note that my 
analysis does not depend on any single definition of constitutional 
“uncertainty” or constitutional “indeterminacy.”24 The question of 
where to set the bar for establishing constitutional certainty is crucial 
to the precedent fallback’s operation because it determines when a 
judge should shift her focus from constitutional text and history to 
judicial precedent. Nevertheless, the precedent fallback maintains the 
same shape regardless of how the concept of constitutional uncertainty 
is defined.25 
This Article begins in Part II by examining the normative 
overlap of stare decisis and originalism on three key issues: 
constraining judicial discretion, contributing to doctrinal stability, and 
promoting the impersonality of law. Part III offers a brief clarification 
of the various roles that precedent can play within originalist 
adjudication. Part IV explains how a fallback rule of deference to 
precedent coheres with several versions of originalism that are 
prominent in the literature. Part V then considers various questions 
about the mechanics of the precedent fallback, including its 
defeasibility, its treatment of recent cases as compared with older ones, 
and its application to nonoriginalist reasoning. I suggest that, while the 
precedent fallback prescribes definitive answers to the latter two 
questions, it does not require any particular view of the countervailing 
circumstances that justify departures from precedent. 
Part VI addresses the argument that constitutional adjudication 
is best understood as consisting of discrete steps of interpretation and 
construction. For those who emphasize such a distinction, the precedent 
fallback can be reconceptualized as a principle of constitutional 
construction. Precedent can also serve as a bridge between theories that 
 
 23.  It is worth noting that this Article makes no attempt to defend or criticize the originalist 
methodology as a general matter. My goal is simply to contribute to the existing account of 
originalism’s relationship with judicial precedent. 
 24.  Technically speaking, it may be more accurate to say “underdeterminacy” rather than 
“indeterminacy” because the Constitution’s text and original meaning will always take some 
options off the table. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical 
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (“The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case 
if and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is identical 
with the set of all imaginable results.”). Nevertheless, for expositional ease and syllabic savings, I 
will use the term “indeterminacy” in the sense of “uncertainty,” with the understanding that the 
term (as I use it here) means that multiple options—as opposed to all conceivable options—are left 
open by the Constitution’s linguistic meaning. 
 25.  See infra Part V.A. 
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endorse the practice of constitutional construction and theories that 
urge the resolution of constitutional uncertainty through interpretive 
methods that were recognized at the time of ratification. Finally, Part 
VII discusses three remaining questions raised by my analysis: whether 
deferring to nonoriginalist precedents poses a threat to originalism; 
whether fidelity to precedent limits the discretion of later judges only 
by amplifying the discretion of earlier ones; and whether the 
evidentiary bar for establishing the Constitution’s original meaning 
should be set high or low. 
II. PRECEDENT AND ORIGINAL MEANING AS  
COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS 
Despite their well-chronicled tension, originalism and stare 
decisis can converge in the values they pursue. I begin by exploring 
these areas of common ground. 
A. Constraint, Stability, and Impersonality 
A constrained judge is one whose discretion is confined by 
preexisting determinants of legal meaning.26 At base, constraint entails 
nothing more than a commitment that limits the subsequent exercise 
of judgment. Even a judge who decides a First Amendment case by 
reference to her own personal commitment to (for example) individual 
liberty is in some sense constrained in her decisionmaking. The same is 
true for all other interpretive touchstones.27 Precommitment to any 
adjudicative theory implies a degree of constraint.28 
Yet constraints can be particularly effective when they emanate 
from an external, publicly available source.29 Publication can enhance 
the clarity with which constraints are understood and fortify them 
against distortion in future cases.30 And while constraints are only 
 
 26.  I follow Thomas Colby in defining judicial “constraint” as relating to “the discretion of 
judges.” Colby, supra note 15, at 751. So defined, the concept of constraint is distinct from judicial 
“restraint . . . in the sense of deference to legislative majorities.” Id. 
 27.  Cf. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 40 (1999) (“[M]ost interpretive approaches can at least 
constrain judges within bounds and in all likelihood could provide greater constraints over time 
as techniques of application are worked out in practice.”). 
 28.  See id. at 39 (“[T]he adoption of any interpretive method constrains judges from engaging 
in arbitrary or willful behavior.”). 
 29.  Cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 6 (1971) (“[A] legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the 
Justices”); id. at 7 (discussing the need to “protect the judge from the intrusion of his own values”).  
 30.  Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial 
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 274–75 (2005) (“Restrained judges render decisions that 
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made necessary by the pressures to defy them, sources of constraint 
that are available for public scrutiny are better designed to retain their 
shape even in the difficult cases, when a judge’s internal 
precommitments might otherwise give way to case-specific impulses. 
The key is the heightened prospect of accountability: when constraints 
are publicly accessible, there is a “basis of legal accountability for the 
power” exercised by those “in positions of authority.”31 
In a similar way, the externality of legal constraints can bolster 
the degree to which the judiciary demonstrates itself as principled and 
consistent.32 It is one thing for a judge to give assurances that she will 
make decisions in accordance with her internal interpretive 
commitments. It is quite another thing for the judge to empower 
onlookers to reach their own conclusions regarding the compatibility of 
her decisions with articulated sources of legal meaning.33 Jeremy 
Bentham suggested that the difference between a “cloak” and a “check” 
is publicity.34 The same principle explains the value of external 
constraints. 
Judicial constraint, particularly constraint that flows from a 
publicly available source, has been an animating force for many 
originalists.35 Emblematic is the position of Justice Scalia, who 
contends that by “establish[ing] a historical criterion that is 
conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself,” 
originalism cabins judicial discretion.36 Justice Scalia has argued that, 
by focusing on predefined, external sources of meaning, originalism 
avoids “judicial personalization of the law” and establishes itself as “the 
lesser evil” among interpretive methodologies.37 More recently, he used 
his concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago as occasion to reiterate 
 
conform to what an experienced lawyer, familiar with the facts of the case and the relevant legal 
authorities, would counsel a client would be the most likely outcome.”). 
 31.  Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
 32.  Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 39 (“Originalism is said to offer at least a 
comparative advantage in being able to constrain judges by providing fairly objective and specific 
criteria by which to evaluate judicial performance.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS 
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 569 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
1994) (noting the importance of “facilitating the operation of the check of professional criticism”). 
 34.  1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827), quoted in Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980). 
 35.  See, e.g., BORK, supra note 6, at 146 (“When a judge finds his principle in the Constitution 
as originally understood, the problem of the neutral derivation of principle is solved . . . . He need 
not, and must not, make unguided value judgments of his own.”); Colby, supra note 15, at 714 
(“Originalism was born of a desire to constrain judges.” (footnote omitted)). 
 36.  Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). 
 37.  Id. at 863–64. 
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that “the question to be decided is not whether the historically focused 
method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial 
Constitution-writing; but whether it is the best means available in an 
imperfect world.”38 
Comparable arguments are salient within the academic 
commentary. Lawrence Solum has explained that one of the central 
tenets uniting different strands of originalism is the belief that 
“constitutional actors,” including judges, “ought to be constrained by the 
original meaning when they engage in constitutional practice.”39 Randy 
Barnett’s theory of constitutional legitimacy is likewise bound up with 
the importance of constraint: because “a written constitution is the 
means by which law is imposed on those who would impose law on the 
general public,” it follows that judges may not alter the Constitution’s 
“meaning at their own discretion.”40 In Professor Barnett’s view, the 
Constitution is designed to “lock-in” rights and “define” and “limit” the 
power of government.41 Such is the language of constraint.42 
In much the same way, judicial constraint can be linked with 
fidelity to precedent. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, in a passage the 
Supreme Court has endorsed,43 deference to precedent is a means of 
preventing the enterprise of judging from becoming the province of “an 
arbitrary discretion.”44 John Adams also looked to precedent as 
displacing “the arbitrary Will or uninformed Reason of Prince or 
Judge.”45 To similar effect is William Blackstone’s contrast of deference 
to precedent with a judge’s disposition of cases “according to his private 
sentiments.”46 And these concerns continue to reverberate, as in Justice 
 
 38.  561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. (“I think it beyond all serious 
dispute that it is much less subjective, and intrudes much less upon the democratic process.”); 
BORK, supra note 6, at 155 (“No other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to 
a defined sphere of authority and thus prevent them from assuming powers whose exercise alters, 
perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic.”). 
 39.  Solum, supra note 17, at 456. 
 40.  Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 615, 637 (2009). 
 41.  Id. at 658; see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” 
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 18 (2006) (“[A] written constitution can perform neither the 
‘lock-in’ or rights-protecting functions if those who are supposed to be bound and limited by its 
terms may alter their meaning at their discretion.”). 
 42.  See also, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 6 (“[T]he Constitution is binding only to 
the extent that judges do not have discretion in its application.”). 
 43.  See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989). 
 44.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 45.  John Adams, Draft correspondence to a newspaper, November 5, 1760, in 1 THE ADAMS 
PAPERS: DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 167 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1961). 
 46.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; see also id. (“[H]e being sworn to 
determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and 
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Scalia’s statement that to “disregard our own precedent” in the absence 
of other guideposts is to “leav[e] only our own consciences to constrain 
our discretion.”47 A host of commentators have likewise underscored the 
constraining force of precedent.48 
At the outset, then, we find adherence to original meaning and 
adherence to judicial precedent sharing a normative foundation. Both 
are mechanisms for ensuring that judges are constrained by a publicly 
available source that is external to themselves.49 For its proponents, 
originalism provides a means of “fixing [the] will” of judges within 
certain bounds.50 Fidelity to precedent promotes the same objective.51 
Within a system that generally treats caselaw as relevant, judges face 
meaningful limits on their ability to disregard precedent.52 
Accompanying those limits is a heightened burden of justification for 
departing from precedent.53 
 
customs of the land . . . .”). But see id. at 69–70 (“Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former 
determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to the divine law.”). 
 47.  Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 673 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 48.  See Merrill, supra note 30, at 278 (“[A]t least in theory, a strong theory of 
precedent . . . will result in more judicial restraint . . . in the context of modern American 
constitutional law”); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 83–84 (2001) (“[S]tare decisis grew in America as a way to restrain . . . the discretion 
that occupies the space left by the indeterminacy of the underlying rules of decision.”); David A. 
Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 300 (2005) (“Precedent 
limits judges in constitutional cases just as it has for a long time limited judges in cases about 
contracts, torts, and property.”); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: 
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 155, 169–70 (2006) (“The core idea of formalism is that the law (constitutions, statues, 
regulations, and precedent) provides rules and that these rules can, do, and should provide a public 
standard for what is lawful (or not).”). 
 49.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A 
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 
1292 (1997) (noting that “text and original understanding” and “precedent” are all “constraints on 
judicial discretion” that serve “as means of tempering judicial arrogance by forcing judges to 
confront, and take into account, the opinions of others”). 
 50.  Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 56 (“The people can constrain their governmental 
agents only by fixing their will in an unchanging text.”).  
 51.  See Christopher J. Peters, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and Constitutional Authority, in 
PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 222 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) (“Stare 
decisis can promote the perception of impartiality by visibly preventing the Court from reaching 
its preferred result.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 977, 981 (2008) (“A judiciary that stood firm with a strong theory of precedent would 
rechannel our nation back toward democratic institutions and away from using the courts to make 
social policy.”). 
 52.  Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 21 (2008) (drawing on 
the work of H.L.A. Hart in stating that “[w]hen judges follow precedents they do so not because 
they fear the imposition of a sanction, but because precedent-following is regarded among them as 
correct practice, as a norm, deviation from which is likely to be viewed negatively”). 
 53.  See id. at 165 (“Precedent, particularly accumulated precedent, can place a significant 
justificatory burden on those minded to decide differently on the same facts.”). 
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A related area of conceptual overlap concerns the value of 
judicial impersonality. Originalism is commonly defended as promoting 
the ideal that the law itself, not the man or woman who dons the judicial 
robe, should determine the resolution of legal disputes.54 Adjudication 
is the province of overarching, durable legal commands that transcend 
any particular dispute and resist the subjective vagaries of judicial 
personality.55 “Judges,” Keith Whittington asserts, “are not simply 
private citizens well positioned to prevent public harm.”56 Only when 
judges subordinate their subjective impulses to the enacted 
Constitution can impersonality flourish.57 
The doctrine of stare decisis can promote similar ideals. The 
Supreme Court has explained that stare decisis facilitates “impersonal 
and reasoned judgments”58 and contributes to the maintenance of a 
legal system in which “bedrock principles are founded in the law rather 
than in the proclivities of individuals.”59 Stare decisis thus emerges 
from, and contributes to, “a conception of a court continuing over 
time.”60 The doctrine’s promotion of impersonality is bound up with its 
substantive neutrality: at its core, stare decisis is committed to no 
agenda other than respect for whatever has gone before.61 
The overlap between original meaning and stare decisis also 
extends to the promotion of stability. Adherence to the Constitution’s 
original meaning can enhance stability by reducing the incidence of 
 
 54.  Cf. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 
211 (2008) (including among the features of the rule of law that “governmental authority . . . be 
impersonal, residing in offices rather than in individuals”). 
 55.  See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 288 (1988) (“The 
outstanding characteristic of original intentions adjudication, for good or ill, is that it is, compared 
with the alternative methods, most likely to produce relatively clear and stable rules for lawful 
government activity.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 129 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Research Papers, Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244, archived at http://perma.cc/FW7-QM33 (stating that a “familiar 
justification for originalism is based on the great value of the rule of law and its associated values, 
predictability, certainty, and stability of legal rules”). 
 56.  WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 140. 
 57.  See BORK, supra note 6, at 318 (“Though there are many who vehemently oppose 
[originalism], that philosophy is essential if courts are to govern according to the rule of law rather 
than whims of politics and personal preference.”). 
 58.  Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970). 
 59.  Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis 
and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 288 (1990) (arguing that the rule of law 
depends on combating the idea that “the Constitution is nothing more than what five Justices say 
it is”). 
 60.  Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 683 (1995). 
 61.  Cf. John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 
540 (2000) (“The basic principle itself is substantively neutral as to possible answers because it 
simply embraces the judicial answer that came first in time.”). 
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judicially initiated change. And deference to precedent ensures that the 
frequent reconsideration of judicial decisions will not “threaten to 
substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal 
stability.”62 It is that stability, the Supreme Court has stated, “upon 
which the rule of law depends.”63 The aspiration is to establish the legal 
system as a framework of durable rules rather than “a series of 
unconnected outcomes.”64 At the same time, deference to precedent can 
protect the settled expectations of those who have acted and made plans 
in reliance on judicial pronouncements.65 The importance of a stable 
backdrop is another consideration that implicates both fidelity to 
original meanings and fidelity to judicial precedent.66 
B. The Promise and Reality of Precedent 
A bad doctrine of stare decisis is little better than none at all. A 
doctrine that is ill-defined or excessively weak will lead not to 
constraint and predictability but to cynicism that the law is being 
applied in good faith. Rather than confidence that judges are acting as 
part of a unified judiciary, appeals to stare decisis will breed suspicion 
of rhetorical cover in service of individual agendas. Yet the promise of 
stare decisis remains integral to American constitutional practice.67 
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to describe the doctrine of stare 
decisis as “indispensable” to the rule of law.68 And there are many 
 
 62.  John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008). 
 63.  CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); see also Nelson, supra note 48, 
at 4 (noting the argument that “the primary purpose of stare decisis is to protect the rule of law by 
avoiding an endless series of changes in judicial decisions”). 
 64.  Farber, supra note 4, at 1179. 
 65.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007) 
(“To be sure, reliance on a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it.”); Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992) (retaining a precedent that had “engendered substantial 
reliance and . . . become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry”); BORK, supra note 6, at 
157 (“Governments need to know their powers, and citizens need to know their rights; expectations 
about either should not lightly be upset.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential 
Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1722–23 (2013) (“Stare decisis protects reliance interests by 
putting newly ascendant coalitions at an institutional disadvantage.”). 
 66.  Notwithstanding the conceptual overlap, the reliance implications of originalism and 
stare decisis may be at odds if a judicial precedent has commanded substantial reliance despite its 
deviation from the Constitution’s original meaning. Even so, my point is simply that the 
underlying impulses in favor of promoting reliance and stability are compatible with originalism 
and stare decisis alike. 
 67.  See supra Part II.A. 
 68.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of 
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect 
for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); see also Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. 
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1987) (asserting that “[t]he rule of law depends in large part on 
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis”). 
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examples in which precedent does seem to play a meaningful role, from 
high-profile disputes in the Supreme Court69 to cases in which lower 
courts heed closely to Supreme Court holdings (and even dicta).70 
Still, the modern doctrine of stare decisis arguably lacks the 
structure and certainty to yield significant benefits, at least with 
respect to the Supreme Court’s “horizontal” treatment of its own 
precedents. Part of the explanation owes to the fact that the Court has 
described its doctrine as a “series of prudential and pragmatic 
considerations.”71 The resulting fluidity impedes consistent application 
across cases. Another problem arises from the continuing debates—not 
simply as a matter of jurisprudential theory, but within Supreme Court 
opinions—over what it means to follow precedent.72 And a third reason 
why the doctrine of stare decisis can seem uncertain and ad hoc is a 
simple matter of growing pains: although the concept of stare decisis 
has a long lineage, the Court’s attempts to “doctrinalize” the treatment 
of precedent are of more recent vintage.73 
Notwithstanding these challenges, my working assumption in 
this Article is that there is some hope yet for precedent. For the reasons 
explained in the previous Section, the doctrine of stare decisis has the 
potential to produce substantial benefits in terms of constraint, 
stability, and impersonality.74 In the following Parts, I presuppose a 
doctrine that is sufficiently stable and determinate to facilitate 
coherent and principled application. The extent to which the existing 
doctrine resembles that ideal is another matter.75 
 
 69.  I would hold up Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000), which 
reaffirmed the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as one prominent example. 
 70.  See Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 198–99 (2014). 
 71.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. 
 72.  See Kozel, supra note 70, at 202–20 (discussing the complexity of formulating and 
applying a consistent definition of precedential scope). 
 73.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 
1168–69 (2008) (describing the 1992 decision in Casey as “the Supreme Court’s first systematic 
attempt to set forth a general theory of the role of precedent and ‘stare decisis’ in constitutional 
adjudication”). 
 74.  See supra Part II.A; cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 189 (“[W]e believe that 
questions of precedent should be settled by rules, not by open-ended balancing tests, because of 
the advantages in terms of predictability and constraint that rules confer.”). 
 75.  For an evaluation of the Supreme Court’s existing doctrine of stare decisis against a 
backdrop of interpretive disagreement, see Randy J. Kozel, Second-Best Stare Decisis, CALIF. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2498125&download=yes, archived at http://perma.cc/VBL5-LC3R. 
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III. FUNCTIONS OF PRECEDENT WITHIN ORIGINALISM 
There are several potential functions of precedent within 
originalism. My focus on the use of precedent as a fallback rule captures 
just one of those functions. To clarify the nature of my argument, I begin 
with a brief overview of other ways in which an originalist judge might 
invoke precedent.76 
1. Historical Precedent. A judge may consult precedent to help 
determine the most accurate interpretation of the Constitution’s 
original meaning. Judicial precedent becomes one of several tools—
which also include constitutional text and structure, as well as evidence 
about historical usage—that can lend meaning to an otherwise 
uncertain provision. The reason for consulting precedent is not that 
there is anything special about judicial case law; it is the recognition 
that precedent can sometimes assist judges in conducting the historical 
inquiry that originalism entails.  
Such uses of precedent are relatively benign in terms of their 
theoretical coherence with originalism. One can certainly imagine 
objections to the reliability of judicial precedents as indicia of the 
Constitution’s original meaning. But those objections deal with 
originalist technique. They do not raise any deeper question about the 
legitimacy of consulting precedent within an originalist framework. 
2. Epistemic Precedent. The second use of precedent is related to 
the first. A judge who is attempting to resolve a constitutional case may 
defer to a prior opinion because she suspects that it is likely to embody 
the correct interpretation of the Constitution’s original meaning.77 Of 
course, this “epistemic”78 use of precedent will extend only to “previous 
decisions that actually attempted to discern original meaning.”79 
 
 76.  For further exploration of various uses of precedent within originalism, see Lee J. Strang, 
An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 1729, 1766–67 (distinguishing between situations in which “[o]riginalist precedent provides 
evidence of how the original meaning is connected to and governs the activity under its purview” 
and situations in which “[o]riginalist precedent . . . determines the Constitution’s meaning” 
through the process of construction). 
 77.  See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 187 (“Precedent may . . . appropriately 
change a judge’s prior beliefs about the correct interpretation, just as the opinion of an expert 
appropriately changes the prior beliefs of decision makers about the conclusion to which the expert 
testifies.”). 
 78.  Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 43 
(2000) (“The Court may presumptively adhere to its past constitutional precedents not because 
precedent, right or wrong, binds, but because precedent can teach and help find the right answer.”).  
 79.  Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It 
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 267 (2005); see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 
187 (“Many cases have deserved no weight on epistemic grounds because they have not attempted 
to derive their results from the Constitution’s original meaning.”). 
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3. Conflicting Precedent. Respect for precedent may drive a judge 
to make a conscious choice to depart from the Constitution’s original 
meaning in pursuit of other values such as the promotion of stability 
and the protection of reliance expectations. As I suggested above, there 
is a wealth of thoughtful commentary about this practice, and scholars 
differ greatly over the situations (if any) in which an overt decision to 
depart from the Constitution’s original meaning is justifiable.80 
4. Fallback Precedent. The fourth use of judicial precedent, and 
the one that will be my focus, is a step removed from following precedent 
notwithstanding its conflict with the Constitution’s original meaning. 
When a judge determines that her inquiry into text, structure, and 
history is unavailing, she might defer to precedent despite the fact that 
it does not shed any light on the Constitution’s original meaning. The 
judge would conclude that, in the absence of textual and historical 
clarity, the best approach is to adopt a presumption of stare decisis. 
That is the use of precedent that I describe as the precedent fallback. 
5. Methodological Precedent. To complete the taxonomy, let us 
briefly consider a final use of precedent that involves the process for 
discerning the Constitution’s original meaning. Interpreting the 
historical record is a complex task, and it stands to reason that different 
judges will sometimes have different perspectives about how best to do 
it. Against that backdrop, we might imagine a judge who defers to her 
predecessors’ choices regarding the process for interpreting the 
Constitution’s language in historical context. The judge might defer to 
her predecessors’ determination that a particular historical account is 
more reliable than others, or that a particular dictionary or newspaper 
is the best indicator of contemporary usage, or so forth. 
The crucial question is why the subsequent judge sees fit to 
defer. If she believes that her predecessors’ choices of materials and 
procedures are likely to be better than her own, then we are back in the 
realm of using precedent to achieve the most accurate interpretation of 
the Constitution’s original meaning. By contrast, if the subsequent 
judge thinks that her predecessors actually made the wrong choice by 
emphasizing a source that is less reliable than some others, to follow 
precedent would be to prioritize case law notwithstanding its conflict 
with the Constitution’s original meaning. 
What if our judge surveys a variety of historical sources that 
point in different directions before concluding that there is no strong 
reason for believing that any is more reliable than the others? May the 
judge select the source that is consistent with existing case law? At first 
blush, there may not appear to be anything objectionable about this 
 
 80.  For an introduction, see Kozel, supra note 5, at 1870–73. 
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practice; the judge must do something, after all, so why not select the 
historical source that is consistent with precedent? Nevertheless, when 
a judge determines that competing historical accounts are equally 
plausible, it follows that the meaning of the relevant constitutional 
provision is uncertain. If using precedent as a tiebreaker is legitimate, 
it must be because stare decisis is a permissible fallback rule. 
IV. INTEGRATING PRECEDENT WITH ORIGINALISM 
Some judges and commentators contend that the Constitution’s 
original meaning is frequently so opaque or inconclusive as to impose 
little constraint on courts.81 Justice Stevens has argued that “[e]ven 
when historical analysis is focused on a discrete proposition . . . the 
evidence often points in different directions.”82 In reality, “a limitless 
number of subjective judgments may be smuggled into” what purports 
to be historical analysis.83 David Strauss similarly concludes that 
“[o]riginalism, as applied to the controversial provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution, is shot through with indeterminacy.”84 For Professor 
Strauss, originalism’s lack of constraining force is one reason why the 
methodology is inferior to alternative theories such as common-law 
constitutionalism.85 
But notice what happens when the constraining effect of original 
meaning—whether one believes that effect to be substantial or 
meager—is paired with the constraining effect of precedent. A judge 
might well conclude that the Constitution’s original meaning is unclear 
as it pertains to a particular dispute. Yet if the judge responds by 
adhering to precedent, she is still acting in accordance with external, 
publicly available sources of law. A judge who falls back on precedent 
 
 81.  See, e.g., Berman, supra note 15, at 89 (“Given the fragmentariness and contestability of 
the historical record, the Originalist judge has substantial discretion, a point at which professional 
historians have long hammered.”); Peters, supra note 51, at 195 (“In our actual world, originalist 
methodology is neither especially transparent nor especially determinate.”); Strauss, supra note 
15, at 970 (“Partly this is just a technical problem of becoming conversant with all the relevant 
materials. But the greater problem is knowing what inferences to draw from those historical 
materials.”). 
 82.  McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 907 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. 
(“The historian must choose which pieces to credit and which to discount, and then must try to 
assemble them into a coherent whole.”). 
 83.  Id. at 908. 
 84.  DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 45 (2010). 
 85.  See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 973 (“Judges pick and choose among precedents, often 
overrule precedents, and follow precedent uncertainly. But it seems to me that originalism is much 
more manipulable. As a practical matter, precedent closes off many options.” (footnote omitted)); 
cf. Colby, supra note 15, at 764 (“The New Originalism is . . . no more constraining than other 
theories of constitutional interpretation. And it may even be less constraining.”). 
         
122 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1:105 
accordingly finds added insulation against the claim that originalism is 
too indeterminate to be constraining. Even when original meaning is 
inadequate to settle a matter, the judge can be constrained by 
precedent.86 The combination of precedent and original meaning yields 
a “thicker” body of norms to guide the process of adjudication than does 
originalism alone.87 Viewed in isolation, originalism and precedent both 
aspire to limit judicial discretion. When the two are combined, their 
constraining power is amplified. 
Much the same is true of the values of stability and 
impersonality. An approach to constitutional law that demands 
adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning will achieve a certain 
degree of stability. But adhering to precedent in situations of 
constitutional uncertainty will go further in lending stability to the law. 
And a judge who subordinates her individual preferences to the 
Constitution’s textual commands can create even more distance 
between her own preferences and the content of the law by deferring to 
precedent when those commands are uncertain. 
Still, none of these benefits is relevant if deference to precedent 
is conceptually inconsistent with a commitment to originalism. To 
explore that possibility, let us examine the precedent fallback’s 
compatibility with several prominent strands of originalist theory.88 
A. Rule of Law Originalism 
Begin with the argument that a paramount dedication to the 
rule of law justifies the adoption of originalism.89 The central idea is 
that the original meaning of the Constitution’s text is better than 
competing methodologies at requiring judges to decide cases based on a 
predefined, external source of legal rules. In addition, applying the 
original meaning of the Constitution satisfies the requirement of 
nonarbitrariness; that is, originalism does not resemble decisionmaking 
processes such as coin flips, which might be fully constraining but which 
 
 86.  See Peters, supra note 51, at 223 (“[T]he best way to enhance the determinacy of 
constitutional law is likely to be the very system of stare decisis that many originalists distrust.”).  
 87.  Merrill, supra note 51, at 980; see also id. (“At this stage in our legal evolution, precedent 
provides more law to draw upon in supplementing the language of the Constitution than do 
originalist sources.”). 
 88.  See Lash, supra note 1, at 1440 (“Because originalism is an interpretive method and not 
a normative constitutional theory, different originalists advance different normative grounds for 
their interpretive approach.”). 
 89.  See Primus, supra note 54, at 211 (“The rule of law is a fundamental constitutional value, 
and many theorists have argued that the rule of law requires originalism.”). 
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nonetheless would flout the rule of law.90 Even if other theories, such as 
pragmatism or common-law constitutionalism, are plausible modes of 
interpretation, the argument goes, originalism is superior due to its rule 
of law effects. 
Accepting the rule of law defense of originalism does not require 
applying the Constitution’s original meaning in every case. A 
prominent illustration of this point comes from the writings of Justice 
Scalia, who has described deference to precedent as a “pragmatic 
exception” to originalism that is grounded in the desire to maintain 
stability.91 Justice Scalia’s willingness to depart from original meaning 
for the sake of upholding precedent has drawn sharp criticism from 
originalists and nonoriginalists alike.92 But his position can be fortified 
through a reconceptualization. Justice Scalia’s depiction of precedent 
can be reframed to emphasize an underlying focus on the rule of law.93 
Fidelity to precedent may sometimes create costs for the rule of law by 
supplanting democratically enacted mandates with (mistaken) judicial 
gloss.94 Yet deference to precedent can also yield rule of law benefits by 
enhancing continuity and avoiding disruption. Putting these features 
together, one might understand originalism as demanding adherence to 
the Constitution’s original meaning unless the competing rule of law 
costs of deviating from precedent exceed some threshold. Rather than a 
pragmatic exception to originalism, deference to precedent becomes an 
outgrowth of the same devotion to the rule of law that justifies 
originalism in the first place. 
The foregoing paragraphs raise the familiar concern with 
whether stare decisis presents a conceptual obstacle for originalism by 
counseling adherence to decisions that stray from the Constitution’s 
 
 90.  Cf. id. at 215 (“The rule ‘Always award judgment to the defendant’ is highly constraining, 
but following it is not a good way to reach substantively valid rulings.”). 
 91.  SCALIA, supra note 4, at 140; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING 
LAW 413–14 (2012) (“Stare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism. It is an exception to textualism 
(as it is to any theory of interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity.”). 
 92.  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 231 (2012) (“If the 
touchstone here is pure practicality, it is hard to see why pure practicality cannot also be the 
touchstone for all issues of constitutional interpretation across the board . . . .”); Barnett, supra 
note 41, at 7 (arguing that Justice Scalia is “not really an originalist at all” for reasons including 
his view of precedent); Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and 
Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2009) (“Deferring to non-originalist precedent dilutes 
originalism and makes it a nakedly discretionary practice . . . .”). 
 93.  See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179–80 
(1989) (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of 
knowing what it prescribes. . . . Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.”). 
 94.  Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 61–62 (noting the argument that a willingness to reconsider 
precedent “promotes ‘democratic values’ by bringing the law enforced in court closer to the 
collective judgments that our representatives have authoritatively expressed”). 
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original meaning. Precedent’s potential value as an asset for originalism 
moves to the forefront when there is no such conflict because the 
Constitution’s original meaning is obscured by vague language or 
inadequate historical evidence. In those situations, a theory of 
originalism that is grounded in the rule of law is compatible with a 
fallback rule of deference to precedent. When it comes to privileging 
external determinants of legal meaning over subjective judgments, a 
judge who resolves a dispute based on her best reading of precedent 
closely resembles a judge who resolves it based on her best 
interpretation of the Constitution’s original meaning. Stare decisis thus 
delivers some of the same rule of law benefits as scrupulous fidelity to 
text and history. 
It certainly does not follow that judicial identity is rendered 
irrelevant to the adjudicative process.95 Different judges will 
occasionally reach different conclusions regarding the implications of 
precedent, just as they will occasionally adopt different interpretations 
of the historical record. Umpires are people, too.96 Still, the consultation 
of precedent, like the consultation of original meaning, will require the 
judge to move beyond her own intuitions to apply predefined, publicly 
accessible legal rules. The effect is to leverage the disciplining power of 
precedent within an originalist framework. From this perspective, the 
choice between constraint by original meanings and constraint by 
judicial precedents is not a choice at all; it is a matter of “and” rather 
than “or.” 
B. Consequentialist Originalism 
A second illustration of precedent’s interplay with original 
meaning involves versions of originalism that are grounded in 
consequentialist analysis. For consequentialists such as John McGinnis 
and Michael Rappaport, the primary reason for adhering to the 
Constitution’s original meaning is the belief that legal rules that were 
created through the supermajoritarian ratification process will tend to 
deliver desirable results.97 Consequentialism presumes that the 
 
 95.  Cf. Dorf, supra note 60, at 685 (“To acknowledge the impersonal ideal of law does not 
require that one deny that an individual judge’s experiences, education, temperament, and values 
often play a decisive role in her resolution of cases.”). 
 96.  The reference to “umpires” is drawn from then-Judge John Roberts’s testimony during 
his Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John 
G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they 
apply them.”). 
 97.  See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (“First, we maintain that a good or 
desirable constitution is one that promotes the welfare of the people and that such a constitution 
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Constitution’s original meaning should be implemented,98 but the 
theory allows for the elevation of precedent over original meaning under 
certain circumstances. For example, when a flawed (in originalist 
terms) precedent has come to receive supermajoritarian support, its 
retention on grounds of stare decisis is justifiable.99 Likewise, if a 
precedent’s overruling would generate extraordinary costs, the 
precedent may be retained despite its deviation from the Constitution’s 
original meaning.100 The driving objective for consequentialists is “to 
use the original meaning when it produces greater net benefits than 
precedent and to use precedent when the reverse holds true.”101 
A focus on cost-benefit analysis also aligns consequentialism 
with deference to precedent in situations where the Constitution’s 
original meaning is uncertain. As a threshold matter, Professors 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that “the Founding generation expected 
precedent to apply to, and continue after, the Constitution,” and that 
nothing in the Constitution’s text forbids adherence to precedent.102 On 
a more conceptual level, the precedent fallback coheres with 
consequentialism’s foundational premises. In the absence of any conflict 
between precedent and original meaning,103 deference to precedent may 
be justified as tending to produce greater benefits than alternative 
approaches to the resolution of constitutional disputes. That is, the 
precedent fallback is consistent with consequentialist originalism so 
long as the functional benefits of stare decisis exceed the benefits of 
alternative responses to the lack of textual and historical clarity.104 For 
those who see significant value in promoting judicial constraint and 
 
should be followed. Second, we hold that passing a constitution through a strict supermajoritarian 
process provides the best method for discovering and enacting a good constitution.”). 
 98.  See id. at 189 (“[T]he strong reasons for following the original meaning generally 
preclude a presumption in favor of precedent.”). 
 99.  See id. at 181–82 (“[E]ntrenched precedent should take priority over the original 
meaning. . . . It is the precedent rather than the original meaning that currently has consensus 
support and thus a presumption of beneficence.”). 
 100.  See id. at 179 (“Precedents should be respected when overruling them would result in 
enormous costs.”). 
 101.  Id. at 177. 
 102.  Id. at 154–55. 
 103.  Cf. id. at 185 (“When the original meaning is uncertain, a far stronger argument exists 
for following precedent—provided that the precedent constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the 
original meaning—than when the precedent clearly conflicts with the original meaning.”). 
 104.  Cf. id. at 186 (“[C]onstitutional ambiguity militates against the original meaning because 
we cannot be sure exactly what meaning obtained consensus support during the enactment 
process.”). 
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legal stability, there is a powerful argument that this condition holds 
true.105 
The precedent fallback’s consequentialist payoff arises from the 
enhancement of predictability, continuity, and uniformity that a sound 
doctrine of precedent can offer by supplementing textual ambiguity 
with durable judicial interpretations.106 It also reflects the importance 
of cultivating impersonal legal norms that resist alteration. Moreover, 
when a precedent has engendered substantial reliance, the 
consequentialist argument for stare decisis becomes even stronger: 
preserving a precedent whose overruling would threaten significant 
disruption—say, by undermining the lawfulness of paper money or 
jettisoning the Social Security system—is a means of controlling 
transition costs.107 
The precedent fallback thus advances the consequentialist 
project of promoting functional benefits without disturbing the baseline 
assumption that respecting supermajoritarian judgments is usually the 
wisest course. To be sure, a different assessment of the respective 
importance of settlement, stability, and constraint could lead to a more 
skeptical view of the precedent fallback. But if one is inclined to ascribe 
significant value to such matters, consequentialist originalism permits 
a fallback rule of deference to precedent. 
C. Popular Sovereignty Originalism 
A third justification for originalism is the principle of popular 
sovereignty. The popular sovereignty account focuses on the nature of 
a written constitution as “a people’s highest expression of its consent to 
the government.”108 Constitutional discourse results in “binding 
expressions of [the people’s] will” that become the “fundamental law” 
for private citizens and public officials alike.109 For popular sovereignty 
originalists, the distinctive nature of constitutional politics dictates 
 
 105.  Cf. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49 (1989) 
(“[A]dherence to rules even when the rules dictate incorrect results—as they inevitably will in 
some cases—may achieve more value and thus be more ‘correct’ than deciding each individual case 
‘correctly.’ ”). 
 106.  See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 185 (“[I]f the original meaning is unclear, 
then there is less reason to follow it. Instead, a precedent that reasonably resolves the uncertainty 
will better promote clarity, even though a court may later believe the precedent resolved the matter 
incorrectly.”). 
 107.  See id. at 186 (“[Reliance costs] will be high when the government establishes a program 
that people rely on to a great extent, such as Social Security. And they will be great when people 
make significant private investments based on assumptions about the law.”). 
 108.  WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 128. 
 109.  Id. at 135. 
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that “the laws of the Constitution trump the laws of the mere 
majority.”110 As compared with the operation of ordinary majoritarian 
politics, the people are engaged in a more foundational enterprise when 
they create and alter the Constitution.111 Within the realm of 
conventional politics, “a variety of factors tend to undermine the link 
between the will of political actors and the actual majoritarian will of 
the people.”112 Constitutional debates alleviate these problems by 
permitting “direct[ ] appeal[s] to” the people and “provid[ing] for the 
highest degree of democratic input by the people directly.”113 It follows 
that popular sovereignty demands respect for original meanings, which 
have “earned the right to be treated as the will of the people.”114 This 
conclusion is reinforced by originalism’s focus on ensuring that every 
generation has the power to engage in its own “higher-order decision 
making.”115 
Viewed against the backdrop of popular sovereignty, conflicts 
between original meaning and stare decisis require consideration of the 
degree to which judicial precedent interferes with the political will.116 
When the judiciary fails to protect a constitutional liberty, the people 
generally retain the power to insulate the neglected liberty through 
legislation, thus mitigating the impact on popular sovereignty.117 That 
creates the possibility that “a conscientious judge could uphold 
erroneous precedent on stare decisis grounds without fatally 
undermining the basic normative principle of democratic 
government.”118 It may be permissible for a court to retain a dubious 
precedent whose overruling would create significant disruption if the 
 
 110.  Lash, supra note 1, at 1445. 
 111.  It is sometimes suggested that the sovereignty of the people ebbs and flows, coming to 
fruition only during the process of constitutional deliberation. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, 
at 143 (“By engaging in constitutional meaning, by entering into a discourse as to what the text 
means and what kind of constitution should govern us, we are drawn into the sovereign.”).  
 112.  Lash, supra note 1, at 1445. 
 113.  Id. at 1445–46; see also id. at 1446 n.24 (“[I]t is the ultimately majoritarian basis of the 
Constitution and its rules for amendment that establish the legitimacy of the document under the 
theory of popular sovereignty.”). 
 114.  Id. at 1444. 
 115.  WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 111; see also id. at 133 (“By accepting the authority of 
the Constitution, we accept our own authority to remake it. The existing Constitution is a 
placeholder for our own future expression of popular sovereignty.”). 
 116.  See Lash, supra note 1, at 1479 (“Under popular sovereignty, ‘judicial error’ is defined in 
reference to the degree of departure from the considered will of the people.”). 
 117.  But cf. Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative 
Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2211 (2014) (“[I]t is possible that failure to intervene in 
cases involving majoritarian interference with the political process would be viewed as imposing 
just as high a cost as erroneous intervention in a matter of claimed immunity.”). 
 118.  Id. at 2213. 
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precedent’s error was the failure to fully protect a constitutional right—
a failure that could be rectified through ordinary legislation. By 
contrast, judicial recognition of rights that do not find support in the 
Constitution’s original meaning tends to be a more serious offense 
against popular sovereignty; the only formal mechanism for political 
correction is the process of constitutional amendment, which is onerous 
and challenging.119 In situations of conflict, then, managing the tension 
between stare decisis and originalism requires considering a 
precedent’s degree of interference with the will of the people. 
In the absence of such a conflict, precedent once again has 
significant potential as a fallback rule. The popular sovereignty 
approach reflects the belief that the enacted Constitution is the highest 
expression of the democratic will.120 If a court defers to a precedent that 
is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning, there is a risk 
that popular sovereignty is being undermined. But that concern does 
not arise when a court chooses to follow precedent only after concluding 
that the Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain. Deferring to 
precedent in those cases does not displace the sovereign will of the 
people with the prerogative of the judiciary. It simply provides a 
fallback rule for channeling judicial discretion where constitutional 
meanings are unclear. 
This analysis, however, must go a step further. A focus on 
popular sovereignty may suggest a problem with deferring to precedent 
even when the inquiry into the Constitution’s original meaning does not 
furnish a clear resolution to a legal dispute. The source of the problem 
is the institution of judicial review.121 Popular sovereignty originalism 
accepts the invalidation of democratically enacted legislation in order 
to effectuate the people’s directives as reflected in the written 
Constitution.122 The rationale is that the people have made the courts 
the “designated enforcer” of the Constitution, which is the ultimate 
embodiment of popular will.123 It is the people’s delegation that saves 
the exercise of judicial review from creating a “counter-majoritarian 
difficulty” by placing the courts in opposition to the forces of 
 
 119.  See Lash, supra note 1, at 1442. 
 120.  See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 46 (describing the argument that “the practice 
of judicial review derives from the Court’s claim to be enforcing the supreme law of the sovereign 
people, which in turn requires an originalist approach”). 
 121.  See, e.g., DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“Chief Justice 
Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, grounded the Federal Judiciary’s authority to exercise judicial 
review and interpret the Constitution on the necessity to do so in the course of carrying out the 
judicial function of deciding cases.” (citation omitted)). 
 122.  AMAR, supra note 92, at 238 (“Marbury-style judicial review presupposes that judges are 
enforcing the people’s document, not their own deviations.”). 
 123.  WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 112. 
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democracy.124 By striking down legislative and executive actions that 
violate the Constitution, courts promote self-government even as they 
confound the efforts of transient political majorities.125  
But popular sovereignty originalism may also suggest that the 
judiciary lacks authority to invalidate political action in the absence of 
a discernible prohibition in the Constitution’s original meaning.126 
When they invoke precedent to rebuff the political branches, the 
argument goes, courts act without democratic authorization to exercise 
the power of judicial review.127 Fidelity to precedent ends up elevating 
the judiciary above the people.128 
Nevertheless, there remains room for a precedent fallback 
within popular sovereignty originalism. To see how, consider a criticism 
that is often leveled against originalism: the application of original 
meanings is inconsistent with the sovereignty of today’s citizens.129 In 
reality, the critics charge, originalism subjects living, breathing persons 
to commitments made by generations long past.130 Among the potential 
responses to this criticism is that the sovereignty of today’s citizens 
stems not from their explicit assent to the Constitution but rather from 
their unquestioned power to change it.131 The authority to alter the old, 
dusty Constitution resides, now and forever, in the generation of the 
moment.132 That authority justifies imposition of the Constitution’s 
imperatives upon those who played no role in the document’s creation. 
 
 124.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
 125.  See Lash, supra note 117, at 2206–07 (“[P]opular sovereigntist constitutional 
government . . . protects the will of the super-majority over the will of the mere majority (or mere 
transient political majorities).” (emphasis added)); Lash, supra note 1, at 1446 (“Popular 
sovereignty theory resolves the [countermajoritarian] difficulty by grounding judicial review in the 
more deeply democratic law of the people.”). 
 126.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 54. But cf. Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New 
American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 129 (2010) (“So long as judges are acting as 
faithful agents to provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely shared by other 
political actors, then their role in articulating constitutional constructions may not be 
objectionable.”). 
 127.  See Lash, supra note 1, at 1447 (“Prior decisions that erroneously identify the original 
meaning of the Constitution lack the very characteristic that, under popular sovereignty, justifies 
judicial review.”). 
 128.  Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not to), 115 
YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006) (“[I]f the meaning of the Constitution’s language fails to provide . . . [a 
sufficiently determinate legal] rule or standard . . . then a court has no basis for displacing the rule 
supplied by some other relevant source of law . . . .”). 
 129.  See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 92, at 1401 (discussing the issue of “dead hand control” over 
subsequent generations). 
 130.  See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 15, at 2036–37. 
 131.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 149 (“The founders’ constitution gains authority over 
us by giving us the capacity to reject it.”). 
 132.  See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 737, 778 (arguing that the Constitution is “our law by virtue of the fact that the 
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A similar argument can support the application of the precedent 
fallback in situations of constitutional uncertainty. Judicial precedent, 
like enacted constitutional text, is binding only to the extent that 
today’s generation allows it to be so. To be sure, the judiciary exacts a 
cost on popular sovereignty when it improperly recognizes 
constitutional rights whose elimination would require a constitutional 
amendment; the amendment process is too costly and cumbersome to 
fully mitigate judicial errors. Still, just as the people hold the power to 
amend problematic constitutional text, they possess the power to 
overturn mistaken judicial interpretations using the very same 
amendment process. 
One might object that this argument proves too much by 
rationalizing adherence to flawed precedents even when the 
Constitution’s original meaning is painstakingly clear. So long as the 
amendment power resides with the people, why should courts ever 
reconsider the judicial decisions of the past, even when those decisions 
conflict with the Constitution’s original meaning? But this challenge 
overlooks a crucial distinction between constitutional clarity and 
constitutional uncertainty. The people’s control over the Constitution 
depends on judicial fidelity to enacted meaning. It does little good for 
the polity to ratify a constitutional amendment overturning a judicial 
decision if, going forward, the courts possess authority to distort the 
amendment itself.133 There is no comparable problem when judges 
respond to a lack of constitutional clarity by deferring to judicial 
precedent. By acknowledging that deference to precedent is permissible 
only within the range of constitutional uncertainty, the judiciary 
concedes its subservience to the people. At the same time, the precedent 
fallback guides judicial discretion when the will of the people cannot 
confidently be discerned. 
The counterargument is that maximizing respect for popular 
sovereignty demands adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning 
or, where the original meaning is uncertain, deference to the actions of 
political government. That position leaves no room for the doctrine of 
stare decisis when the result is to strike down legislative or executive 
action. But while such arguments are certainly reasonable, not every 
constitutional lawyer who comes to originalism through devotion to 
popular sovereignty must seek to optimize that value at the expense of 
all others. Instead, it is plausible to argue that, while respect for 
 
Founding generation made the Constitution, and each generation can amend the Constitution, 
under largely the same supermajority rules”). 
 133.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 156 (“The ideal of popular sovereignty would be 
meaningless if others could set the actions of the sovereign aside.”). 
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popular sovereignty is essential, it demands only that judges apply the 
enacted Constitution where its original meaning is discernible, because 
the contrary view would undermine the people’s power to control the 
document that governs them. When original meaning is uncertain, 
judges may defer to precedent in order to promote other values such as 
doctrinal continuity and impersonal adjudication. Even if it leads to the 
invalidation of political action, adherence to precedent is justified by its 
effects on doctrinal continuity, legal stability, and the power of 
constitutional law to transcend periodic “changes in the composition of 
the court.”134 
The point is not that devotion to popular sovereignty requires 
acceptance of the precedent fallback. The claim is simply this: For those 
who see greater value in fostering doctrinal consistency and systemic 
stability than in validating legislative and executive actions that 
conflict with existing case law, a fallback rule of deference to precedent 
can form a legitimate component of popular sovereignty originalism. 
D. Other Theories of Originalism 
While versions of originalism grounded in the rule of law, 
consequentialism, and popular sovereignty are of special interest due 
to their prominence in the recent literature, the utility of the precedent 
fallback extends to other versions of originalism as well. To take one 
more example, consider the argument that originalism has a basis in 
legal positivism,135 meaning that the methodology’s legitimacy derives 
from its social acceptance.136 To oversimplify (greatly), the positivist 
claim is that the content of constitutional law is understood by the 
relevant stakeholders as flowing from the Constitution’s original 
meaning, including its provisions for changing the law as it initially 
existed. 
The operation and implications of such a view are complex, but 
the takeaway for present purposes is more straightforward. If one is 
persuaded by the positivist argument regarding the relevance of the 
Constitution’s original meaning, there is a strong basis for 
 
 134.  BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146 (1921). But cf. id. (“I 
think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be 
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in 
frank avowal and full abandonment.”). 
 135.  I am grateful to Will Baude, who is in the process of developing a positivist account of 
originalism, for suggesting the relevance of positivist theories to this Article’s analysis.  
 136.  For a recent inquiry into originalism’s potential connection with positivism, see Stephen 
E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498838, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/SW9W-RQG4. 
         
132 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1:105 
acknowledging a role for judicial precedent. Attention to precedent is a 
well-established and well-accepted part of America’s constitutional 
consciousness.137 And as explained in greater detail below, there is 
historical support for the liquidation of constitutional uncertainty 
through judicial pronouncements.138 To the extent it is persuasive, then, 
the positivist account of originalism would seem to leave ample room 
for a precedent fallback. 
The example of positivism underscores the point that the 
precedent fallback is not tethered to any particular strand of 
originalism. The fallback rule is compatible with multiple versions of 
originalism as a mechanism for controlling adjudicative change while 
preserving a primary commitment to the Constitution’s original 
meaning. Even so, the precedent fallback is not suitable for all versions 
of originalism. For example, I argued above that it is possible to believe 
both that (a) respect for popular sovereignty requires the application of 
the Constitution’s original meaning when that meaning can confidently 
be discerned, and (b) judges may legitimately defer to precedent when 
the Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain.139 Yet, as I suggested, 
such an argument will be unsatisfying to those who believe that the 
power of judicial review is authorized only when the Constitution’s 
commands are clear. Nor will the precedent fallback find favor among 
those who believe that maximizing popular sovereignty trumps 
competing values such as doctrinal stability even when the people act 
through ordinary legislation rather than constitutional amendment. 
The precedent fallback is likewise at odds with the belief that 
the Constitution’s text and structure foreclose the invocation of judicial 
precedent to resolve constitutional uncertainties. Particularly notable 
on this point is the work of Michael Stokes Paulsen. Professor Paulsen 
contends that the Constitution contains both instructions for 
interpreting the document’s textual meaning and principles for 
deciding what happens “when that meaning runs out.”140 Specifically, 
“the logic of the governmental structure created by the Constitution 
indicates that the democratic, republican institutions vested with 
legislative and executive power” are the bodies charged with operating 
in the realm of textual uncertainty.141 Professor Paulsen concludes that 
political actions “must stand” unless they are “contrary to a rule of law 
 
 137.  See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 84, at 33–34 (emphasizing the centrality of precedent in 
constitutional litigation and adjudication). 
 138.  See infra Part V. 
 139.  See supra Part IV. 
 140.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So Help Me 
God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1434 (2014). 
 141.  Id. at 1435. 
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supplied by exegesis of the text.”142 The effect of his argument is to 
prohibit judges from falling back on precedent, at least when the result 
would be to invalidate political action. Professor Paulsen’s account 
helps to illustrate why it would be incorrect to characterize the 
precedent fallback as suitable for every version of originalism. Yet for 
those who come to originalism through other normative and 
methodological commitments—such as the commitments discussed 
earlier in this Part—the precedent fallback remains worthy of 
consideration as a response to constitutional uncertainty. 
V. THE MECHANICS OF FALLING BACK 
Having examined the precedent fallback’s conceptual 
underpinnings and its coherence with prominent originalist theories, I 
turn to the issue of implementation.143 
A. Deference as Absolute or Presumptive? 
The threshold question of implementation is whether the 
precedent fallback should be rebuttable or absolute. An absolute 
presumption would foreclose any deviation from precedent in cases 
where the Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain. A rebuttable 
presumption would permit the overruling of precedent in light of some 
set of countervailing considerations. 
Both the absolute presumption and the rebuttable presumption 
are tenable approaches to the treatment of precedent within the 
framework of originalism. There is no inherent problem with concluding 
that the precedent fallback should be unwavering. Nor is there any 
inherent problem with adopting a fallback preference for precedent 
while recognizing that the preference may yield to other 
 
 142.  Id. at 1437. 
 143.  The analysis set forth in this Part, like this Article more generally, is limited to the 
domain of constitutional precedents. I make no claims about the suitability of the analysis for 
common-law or statutory precedents. I thus leave open the possibility that judge-made rules of 
procedure or evidence that do not have a direct constitutional grounding should be more open to 
reconsideration than are constitutional rules. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233–34 
(2009) (“[T]he Saucier rule [for qualified immunity cases] is judge made and implicates an 
important matter involving internal Judicial Branch operations. Any change should come from 
this Court, not Congress.”). Nor do I necessarily endorse the conventional wisdom that 
constitutional rulings should receive weaker deference than other judicial decisions—a position 
that I view as understating the value of constitutional settlement and the benefits of channeling 
constitutional change through the Article V amendment process. See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (noting the elevated strength of deference to statutory 
precedents). 
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considerations.144 But despite the legitimacy of both approaches, the 
choice between them is crucial. Every recognized basis for overruling a 
precedent creates a risk of diminishing doctrinal stability and 
predictability. Likewise, the level of constraint that judges face will 
dissipate to the extent they are permitted to invoke a variety of flexible 
considerations as justifications for departing from disfavored 
precedents. 
Under the strongest formulation of the precedent fallback, a 
judicial decision would be reconsidered only if it clashed with the 
Constitution’s discernible meaning. When the judiciary has responded 
to constitutional uncertainty through the creation of precedent, nothing 
short of eliminating that uncertainty would trigger a reversal of course. 
Such an approach would bolster the disciplining effect of precedent and 
enhance the continuity of the legal order. Notwithstanding these 
benefits, however, irrebuttable deference to precedent would 
compromise other values: if a troublesome precedent did not violate the 
Constitution’s discernible meaning, the legal system would be burdened 
by the precedent unless and until the Constitution was formally 
amended. 
Those who are uncomfortable with such a strong rule of 
precedent might recognize additional grounds for overruling in the face 
of constitutional uncertainty. For example, overrulings might be 
permitted in cases involving factual mistakes or anachronisms.145 When 
material facts have changed or been proven false, there is a powerful 
argument for updating a precedent so it no longer rests on faulty 
foundations.146 In addition, there is good reason to reconsider 
precedents that have proven unworkable—another consideration that, 
like a precedent’s factual mistakes, is relevant to the Supreme Court’s 
existing stare decisis jurisprudence. Overrulings might also be 
acceptable for precedents whose consequences are immoral or 
destructive.147 Of course, treating precedents as defeasible based on 
distaste for their results raises serious concerns in terms of the ability 
of stare decisis to constrain judicial discretion; if precedents are 
vulnerable whenever a judge deems them “bad,” the precedent fallback 
 
 144.  Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1009 (2009) 
(“[A] constraint need not be absolute in order to count as a constraint.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (including 
among the factors that are relevant to a precedent’s durability “whether facts have so changed, or 
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or 
justification”). 
 146.  Cf. Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 37, 40–41 (2013) (discussing the rule of law costs of abiding by mistaken precedents). 
 147.  Cf. Solum, supra note 48, at 200 (discussing the status of “evil” precedents). 
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loses its power to unify the voice of different judicial actors working 
across time. It is nevertheless intelligible to assert that, within a 
narrow band of cases, a precedent’s harmful results should trigger its 
reconsideration notwithstanding the attendant reduction in judicial 
constraint. 
The more general point is that so long as the grounds for 
overruling are predefined and adequately cabined, a fallback rule that 
permits departures from precedent can promote stability, 
impersonality, and constraint. Such benefits obviously will not be as 
great as they would be with a rule of absolute deference. Still, whether 
one adopts a stronger or weaker view of the strength of stare decisis, 
the precedent fallback remains available as a means of channeling 
judicial discretion when the Constitution’s original meaning is 
uncertain. 
B. Precedential Status as Immediate or Gradual? 
Beyond the characterization of deference as defeasible or 
absolute, another question of implementation is when a judicial ruling 
should become “vested” in the sense of warranting stare decisis effect. 
Does a single decision carry the power to settle an issue? Or must 
constitutional law develop more gradually through judicial 
reaffirmances—or at least repeated applications—over the course of 
time? 
Overruling a precedent that has been applied or reaffirmed on 
numerous occasions creates a risk of disrupting settled expectations 
and destabilizing the law, which may suggest that recent decisions 
should be more amenable to reconsideration than are longstanding and 
entrenched lines of cases.148 Yet even the overruling of a recent opinion 
can challenge the impersonality of constitutional adjudication. Imagine 
if a new Supreme Court appointment in the coming years led to the 
abrupt overruling of a high-profile case, such as Citizens United v. 
FEC.149 Or recall Justice Marshall’s dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, in 
which he vehemently criticized the majority for overruling recent 
precedents despite the fact that “[n]either the law nor the facts,” but 
“[o]nly the personnel of this Court,” had changed.150 The possibility that 
 
 148.  See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 152 (2010) (“[T]he more 
recently the earlier case was decided, the less forcefully the stare decisis anti-overruling principle 
should be applied.”). 
 149.  558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (refusing to accept Citizens United in an opinion joined by three other 
justices). 
 150.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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recent precedents could effectively be undermined by a change—even a 
single change—in the composition of the Court tends to conflate the 
meaning of constitutional law with matters of judicial identity. It also 
reinforces both the perception and reality that constitutional change 
occurs through the judicial appointment process rather than the Article 
V amendment process. In designing the precedent fallback, the better 
approach is to treat all precedents as entitled to deference when the 
Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain. The fact that a judicial 
opinion is of recent vintage does not diminish its claim to presumptive 
respect. 
C. Deference for Some or Deference for All? 
Given its emphasis on stability and impersonality, the precedent 
fallback does not discriminate based on the style of reasoning that a 
judicial opinion embodies. In particular, it does not reserve its 
presumption of deference for originalist precedents while treating 
nonoriginalist precedents as unworthy of fidelity. Instead, all 
precedents can warrant deference, as long as they do not violate 
whatever indicia of constitutional meaning are discernible. Prior 
judicial responses to constitutional uncertainty are entitled to respect 
even if their mode of reasoning is nonoriginalist.151 
Prominent commentators have rejected the argument that 
nonoriginalist precedents deserve the same deference as precedents 
decided on originalist grounds. Robert Bork contended that “precedents 
that reflect a good-faith attempt to discern the original understanding 
deserve far more respect than those that do not.”152 In addition, 
Lawrence Solum has urged greater deference for certain types of 
precedents under his “neoformalist” approach to stare decisis. Professor 
Solum recognizes value in judicial opinions whose mode of reasoning is 
grounded in formalist considerations such as “constitutional text or 
precedent.”153 His model accords less deference to judicial opinions that 
employ “instrumentalist” considerations such as “moral goodness or 
consequences.”154 Professor Solum’s explanation for this divergent 
treatment is that instrumentalist reasoning, which depends heavily on 
 
 151.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 172 (“A constitutional theory respecting the role of 
both interpretation and construction in fact assumes the existence of practices that cannot be 
justified in originalist terms, for constructions necessarily operate where interpretations cannot 
go.”). 
 152.  BORK, supra note 6, at 157–58. 
 153.  Solum, supra note 48, at 204. 
 154.  Id.; see also id. at 203–04 (“If a decision rests on instrumentalist grounds, then the prima 
facie case for regarding the decision as binding is rebutted.”). 
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“the private judgments of adjudicators,” hinders the function of law in 
“provid[ing] public standards for the resolution of disputes.”155 
Instrumentalist judging also makes it more difficult to forge “a 
relatively high degree of consensus about what [a legal] code means and 
how it applies.”156 The implication, Professor Solum concludes, is that 
instrumentalist decisions should be more susceptible to overruling than 
are originalist ones.157 
Notwithstanding forceful arguments like those of Judge Bork 
and Professor Solum, nonoriginalist precedents can settle areas of 
textual and historical uncertainty by articulating constitutional rules 
of decision. Moreover, nonoriginalist precedents, no less than originalist 
ones, can constrain future judges. When nonoriginalist reasoning 
furnishes the infrastructure of a judicial opinion, it becomes a publicly 
available source of law that can engender reliance and limit judicial 
discretion regardless of the normative sympathies that future judges 
might harbor. This is not to say that every statement and prescription 
contained within a nonoriginalist opinion (or, for that matter, an 
originalist one) warrants deference going forward; as I will discuss 
below, defining a precedent’s scope of constraint is a separate 
concern.158 But on the more basic question of whether a judicial opinion 
warrants any deference at all, the precedent fallback draws no 
distinctions based on the style of reasoning that the opinion reflects.159 
If a court concludes that the Constitution’s original meaning is too 
uncertain to resolve a dispute, the court should treat precedent as 
entitled to presumptive respect regardless of its mode of reasoning. 
VI. PRECEDENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
Thus far I have contended that the precedent fallback is 
consistent with prominent versions of originalism. I have also claimed 
that the fallback rule can enhance originalism’s ability to constrain 
judges and promote legal continuity. This Part extends the analysis to 
 
 155.  Id. at 181–82. 
 156.  Id. at 182. 
 157.  See id. at 194 (“Prior decisions which rest on formalist grounds could be given full binding 
force, whereas precedents that rest on instrumentalist grounds could be treated as entitled only to 
presumptive validity.”); id. at 201 (“[T]he neoformalist conception does not require that unlawful 
decisions be regarded as binding; one reason a decision may be regarded as unlawful for this 
purpose is that the decision rests on instrumentalist rather than formalist grounds.”). 
 158.  See infra Part VII.B. 
 159.  In this respect, the precedent fallback also differs from the theory of precedent advanced 
by Lee Strang, who argues that “courts should overrule nonoriginalist constitutional precedent 
except when overruling the precedent would gravely harm society’s pursuit of the common good.” 
Strang, supra note 3, at 420 (footnote omitted). 
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the process of constitutional construction, which has received 
considerable attention in constitutional scholarship of late.160 The 
interpretation-construction distinction raises unique concerns about 
originalism’s constraining force.161 I suggest that the precedent fallback 
is a promising tool for alleviating those concerns. 
A. Distinguishing Interpretation from Construction 
Several scholars have pressed the argument that constitutional 
adjudication is most profitably viewed as consisting of two steps: 
interpretation and construction. Interpretation refers to the 
discernment of the Constitution’s linguistic meaning. Construction 
refers to the “translat[ion]” of linguistic meaning into rules, principles, 
and decisions.162  
The practice of interpretation, revolving as it does around 
semantic meaning, depends on “linguistic facts . . . about patterns of 
usage.”163 The objective is to uncover the Constitution’s “communicative 
content,” which includes “the words and phrases as combined by the 
rules of syntax and grammar” and “additional content provided by the 
available context of legal utterance.”164 Yet communicative content 
alone cannot resolve a constitutional dispute. 
That is where construction comes in. Technically speaking, even 
when the Constitution’s linguistic meaning is clear, the decision to 
implement that meaning reflects a principle of construction (assuming 
that one accepts the interpretation-construction divide).165 A judge 
conceivably could choose to ignore unmistakable constitutional text 
based on considerations such as justice or policy. But adherence to 
originalism negates that possibility.166 For originalists, the role of 
 
 160.  See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 126, at 119. 
 161.  See, e.g., Solum, supra note 17, at 502–03. 
 162. Solum, supra note 16, at 103 (“Courts engage in judicial construction when they translate 
the linguistic meaning of a legal text into doctrine.”). 
 163.  Id. at 104. 
 164.  Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479, 488 (2013).  
 165.  See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 
67 (2011) (“Where the semantic meaning of the text provides enough information to resolve a 
particular issue about constitutionality, applying it will require little, if any, supplementation, and 
construction will look indistinguishable in practice from interpretation.”); Solum, supra note 17, 
at 499 (“In some cases, judges may attend only to interpretation (because construction seems 
obvious and intuitive). In other cases, judges may focus entirely on construction . . . But in either 
case, construction occurs.”). 
 166.  Cf. Solum, supra note 164, at 482 (“[O]riginalists characteristically endorse . . . the 
constraint principle—which requires that the communicative content of the 
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construction moves to the forefront only “when the traditional tools of 
interpretation exhaust themselves.”167 The question then becomes how 
to “determine legal effect when the meaning of the text runs out.”168 
Linguistic indeterminacy may arise in several ways. The 
historical record may have become too fragmented or opaque to furnish 
a reliable answer to a particular problem, leading to what Professor 
Solum has called “epistemic ambiguity.”169 Alternatively, a term may 
be so “general, abstract, and vague” as to defy resolution based on 
linguistic meaning alone.170 One possible example of this phenomenon 
is the Fourth Amendment’s use of the phrase “unreasonable searches 
and seizures,” in which “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ communicates no 
bright lines to distinguish whether a particular mode of searching is 
permissible or impermissible.”171 Another is the scope of the “judicial 
Power of the United States” as articulated in Article III. That power 
pretty clearly includes some things, such as conducting a “trial of an 
action of trespass on the case,”172 and excludes others, such as enacting 
a criminal statute. But there may be “borderline” cases, like “conducting 
an administrative hearing in a dispute between the government and a 
contractor over payments,” in which the constitutional text and 
historical context fall short of furnishing a clear answer.173 
Linguistic indeterminacy may also arise from “gaps” in the 
constitutional framework that leave courts and other public officials 
without “clear instruction for resolving important constitutional 
issues.”174 Like constitutional ambiguities, gaps may reflect either a 
“genuine oversight by constitutional drafters or . . . delegation to future 
political decision-makers.”175 Whatever their genesis, gaps open the 
door for constitutional construction. If, for example, the enacted 
Constitution contains a gap regarding how executive branch officials 
 
Constitution . . . should constrain the content of constitutional doctrine, unless a defeasibility 
condition obtains.”). 
 167.  Whittington, supra note 126, at 121. 
 168.  Solum, supra note 17, at 516 (“[D]efault rules are paradigm cases of rules of construction. 
The whole idea of a default rule is to determine legal effect when the meaning of the text runs 
out.”). 
 169.  Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
409, 440 (2009). 
 170.  Solum, supra note 17, at 458 (arguing that “the actual text of the U.S. Constitution 
contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction for their 
application to concrete constitutional cases”). 
 171.  Barnett, supra note 40, at 635. 
 172.  Solum, supra note 17, at 501. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Whittington, supra note 126, at 123. 
 175.  Id. 
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“are to be removed from office,”176 the result is an indeterminacy that 
can be resolved through construction. 
In each of these categories of constitutional indeterminacy, 
whatever indicia of linguistic meaning are discernible must be 
respected, so the zone of judicial discretion—that is, “the construction 
zone”177—will always be bounded.178 Within that zone, however, factors 
beyond linguistic meaning will carry the analytical burden.179 
B. Perspectives on Constitutional Construction 
Any theory of originalism that emphasizes the interpretation-
construction distinction must furnish one or more principles of 
construction for responding to linguistic indeterminacy. The content of 
those principles will reflect underlying beliefs about the nature and 
ends of constitutional adjudication.180 In Section C, I will recharacterize 
the precedent fallback as a principle of construction that requires 
presumptive fidelity to precedent based on a paramount commitment 
to the stability and impersonality of law. Before doing so, it will be 
useful to compare—in brief and, thus, oversimplified fashion—several 
approaches to construction that are prominent in the literature. 
One proponent of the distinction between interpretation and 
construction is Randy Barnett, who argues that the judicial response to 
constitutional indeterminacy should be shaped by the recognition that 
“lawmakers acting pursuant to their constitutional powers govern those 
who did not consent.”181 In order to safeguard the rights of the governed, 
the Constitution’s “vague terms should be given the meaning that is 
most respectful of the rights of all who are affected.”182 This view leads 
Professor Barnett to endorse a “presumption of liberty,” whereby 
constitutional indeterminacy is resolved against governmental 
 
 176.  Id. at 123–24. 
 177.  Solum, supra note 16, at 108. 
 178.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 647 
(1999) (“[W]hen the original public meaning of a term or provision in a written constitution fails 
to provide a unique rule of law to apply to a particular case, it still provides a ‘frame’ that, while 
excluding many possibilities, requires choice among the set of unexcluded alternatives.”).  
 179.  Barnett, supra note 165, at 69 (arguing that rules of construction “are rules that apply 
when the information conveyed by the text itself is insufficient to decide an issue, but the issue 
still must somehow be decided”). 
 180.  Cf. Barnett, supra note 40, at 636–37 (“[O]ne’s theory of construction inescapably 
depends on one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy.”); Whittington, supra note 126, at 121 (noting 
that “constitutional constructions make normative appeals about what the Constitution should be, 
melding what is known about the Constitution with what is desired”). 
 181.  RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
125 (2004). 
 182.  Id. at 126. 
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“infringement on individual freedom.”183 Professor Barnett defends the 
presumption of liberty based in part on its effectiveness at 
“implementing the original meaning of the text” as understood in light 
of provisions such as the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.184 
Professor Barnett also advocates a more general preference for 
“constructions that enhance the legitimacy of the Constitution,” with a 
focus on the “qualities that enable a legal system to issue laws that bind 
in conscience those upon whom they are imposed.”185 Among the 
relevant considerations are whether “laws are ‘proper,’ in that the laws 
do not violate [people’s] rights,” and whether laws “are ‘necessary’ to 
protect the rights of others.”186 Finally, if “competing constructions are 
both equally consistent with original meaning and not clearly 
preferable on grounds of legitimacy,” it may be appropriate to retain 
prior judicial constructions “subject to the doctrine of precedent.”187 
In contrast to Professor Barnett, Jack Balkin envisions 
constitutional construction as the process by which “each generation” 
decides “how to make sense of the Constitution’s words and principles” 
by “applying them to our own time and our own situation.”188 The role 
of the courts is “usually more cooperative than competitive” with the 
actions of political government.189 The judiciary “rationalizes and 
supplements constitutional constructions by the political branches[ ] 
and responds to changes in political and cultural values in the nation 
as a whole.”190 Judicial doctrine becomes a means of both “legitimation” 
and “policing.”191 It enables courts to “provid[e] reasons why the 
constructions” of the political branches “are faithful to the 
Constitution.”192 At the same time, the creation of doctrine allows courts 
to “set boundaries on what the political branches can do”193 and to 
“impose the values of national majorities on regional or local 
 
 183.  Id. at 259–60. 
 184.  See Barnett, supra note 79, at 265 & n.22. 
 185.  See id. at 265. 
 186.  Barnett, supra note 40, at 643. 
 187.  Barnett, supra note 79, at 265. 
 188.  Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293, 352 
(2007); see also Dorf, supra note 15, at 2012 (characterizing Professor Balkin’s argument as 
indicating that “the Constitution’s legitimacy derives from a historical process of continual popular 
commitment to see in the Constitution the possibility of redeeming the document’s own promises 
of a more just society”). 
 189.  JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 300 (2011). 
 190.  Id.; see also Adam M. Samaha, Talk About Talking About Constitutional Law, 2012 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 783, 788 (noting Professor Balkin’s emphasis on “today’s conventional modes of 
constitutional argument and the results reached thereunder”). 
 191.  BALKIN, supra note 189, at 300. 
 192.  Id. at 300–01. 
 193.  Id. at 301. 
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majorities.”194 Through this combination of legitimation and policing, 
courts safeguard the people’s authority to “fill out” the constitutional 
framework “over time.”195 That process can entail the overruling of 
judicial precedents, which should not persist after their principles have 
been rendered “obsolete” by “changes in demographics, economics, 
technology, social customs, or other features of social life.”196 
A third approach to construction comes from Keith Whittington. 
Professor Whittington underscores the importance of deferring to the 
political branches in cases of constitutional indeterminacy.197 While 
judicial review of political action is appropriate when the courts are 
enforcing determinate meanings that are closely linked to 
constitutional text, “[i]t is . . . a harder case to make out that courts 
should have the authority to trump the actions of elected officials 
merely on the basis of constitutional constructions.”198 Even so, 
Professor Whittington suggests that judicial doctrines may reflect 
acceptable “efforts at filling in the constitutional framework.”199 
Deference to the political branches is a vital part of constitutional 
construction, but there is room for courts to venture beyond the 
determinate meaning of constitutional text in order to “provisionally 
maintain constitutional understandings widely shared by other 
political actors.”200 
Taken in combination, these examples provide a sense of how 
principles of construction are developed and defended. They also 
highlight the connection between the process of constitutional 
construction and underlying theories of constitutional legitimacy. The 
 
 194.  Id. at 302. 
 195.  Compare id. at 3 (describing a theory of “framework originalism” that “views the 
Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that 
Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction”), with id. at 54 (“In 
framework originalism . . . popular sovereignty is not only central to the creation of the written 
framework, it also underwrites the constructions built on top of the framework that flesh it out 
over time.”). 
 196.  Id. at 124; see also id. (“When previous constructions no longer make sense or have 
become deeply unjust or unworkable, it is time to adjust them or substitute new ones.”). 
 197.  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 172 (“[A]n originalist judiciary . . . would not strike 
down every government action that cannot be justified in originalist terms but only those that are 
inconsistent with known constitutional requirements.”). 
 198.  Whittington, supra note 126, at 127. 
 199.  Id. at 128. 
 200.  Id. at 129. This is not the only reason why one might endorse judicial restraint in the 
face of constitutional uncertainty. For example, Adrian Vermeule has defended a restrained 
approach for reasons including the relative competencies of courts and legislatures. See ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 230 (2006) (“Judges should . . . defer to legislatures on 
the interpretation of constitutional texts that are ambiguous, can be read at multiple levels of 
generality, or embody aspirational norms whose content changes over time with shifting public 
values.”). 
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optimal process of construction will vary depending on whether one’s 
normative touchstone is individual liberty, collective self-government, 
or otherwise. Further, even theories that are not explicitly couched in 
the language of constitutional construction can be translated into 
compatible terms. A salient example is Gary Lawson’s suggestion that 
linguistic indeterminacy should be resolved “against the existence of 
federal power and in favor of the existence of state power.”201 Such a 
claim can be reframed as a principle of construction to guide the 
resolution of disputes when the Constitution’s original meaning is 
indeterminate.202 The broader point is that the available approaches to 
construction are not limited to those that expressly endorse the 
interpretation-construction divide. 
Selecting a principle of constitutional construction is not the 
only issue that divides construction-minded originalists. There are also 
differences of opinion over what portion of the constitutional landscape 
is settled by linguistic meaning. For example, Professor Balkin 
contends that although the Constitution’s “basic framework” must be 
respected, it “does not settle most disputed questions of constitutional 
interpretation.”203 Other scholars will be more inclined to find 
constitutional determinacy based on their interpretation of the relevant 
linguistic facts. But regardless of how one defines the area in which 
construction is required, within that zone there must be an appeal to 
an organizing normative theory and a corresponding set of adjudicative 
tools.204 
C. The Precedent Fallback as a Principle of Construction 
We have seen that judges can respond to linguistic 
indeterminacy in myriad ways. They can defer to the political branches, 
pursue the coherence of constitutional law with contemporary moral 
sensibilities, or protect individual liberty against governmental 
 
 201.  Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012); see also id. at 
1234–35 (“If it is uncertain whether the Constitution forbids a state from acting, the state (or 
whoever claims under the relevant state act) wins.”). 
 202.  See Solum, supra note 17, at 513 (“Lawson’s default rules are best viewed as rules of 
construction.”); see also Lawson, supra note 201, at 1235 (“One could, of course, call [the proposed] 
allocation of burdens of proof a kind of constitutional construction [but] . . . [t]he proposition that 
he who asserts must prove is a basic principle of rational thinking, not a normative theory of 
governance.”). 
 203.  Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 
649 (2013). 
 204.  See id. at 718 (“Lawyers engaged in constitutional construction are building out the 
Constitution-in-practice. In so doing, they can and should use all of the available tools of argument 
and persuasion.”). 
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encroachment.205 Given the normative overlap of originalism and stare 
decisis,206 it is also worth considering another approach to 
constitutional construction: judges faced with linguistic indeterminacy 
can fall back on precedent.207 
The precedent fallback is grounded in the pursuit of judicial 
constraint and legal continuity. Deference to precedent can limit 
judicial discretion, reduce the role of subjective judgment, and bolster 
the idea that constitutional law has an independent essence apart from 
the periodic comings and goings on the judicial bench.208 I explained in 
Part III how these objectives support a fallback rule of deference to 
precedent as an intrinsic component of originalist theory. Refashioned 
as a tool of constitutional construction, the precedent fallback advances 
the same goals through a different analytical framework. 
As an approach to constitutional construction, the precedent 
fallback entails that when the Constitution’s linguistic meaning is 
indeterminate, courts should act in a manner that is heavily 
constrained by external sources and that enhances systemic stability, 
resists disruption, and draws together individual judges as part of a 
cohesive whole. The precedent fallback implies that courts should 
pursue these goals even at the expense of other objectives such as 
maximizing individual liberty or deferring to political government. 
When a judge has doubts about the Constitution’s original meaning as 
applied to a given dispute, she should defer to existing case law—
thereby redirecting the forces of legal change toward other channels.209 
This is true regardless of whether the relevant precedents are 
originalist or nonoriginalist in their reasoning.210 What matters is a 
 
 205.  For discussion of another potential approach to constitutional construction, see Solum, 
supra note 17, at 473 (“The Moral Readings Theory contends that the resolution of constitutional 
issues in the construction zone should be guided directly by considerations of political morality.”).  
 206.  See supra Part II.A. 
 207.  Cf. Barnett, supra note 79, at 265 (“[J]udicial constructions of the Constitution that are 
not inconsistent with original meaning may well be subject to the doctrine of precedent.”); Solum, 
supra note 16, at 105 n.21 (“[O]ne might argue that constructions must be consistent with the 
purposes, functions, or goals that motivated adoption of the text, and that judicial construction 
should be bound by the doctrine of stare decisis.”); Strang, supra note 76, at 1784 (“[O]riginalist 
precedent in the context of construction resolves original indeterminacy.”). 
 208.  See Dorf, supra note 60, at 683 (“While stare decisis does not preclude the occasional 
overruling of cases, the fact that a court’s personnel have changed and the new judges have a 
different view of the law from that of their predecessors is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for 
overruling.”); supra Part II.A. 
 209.  Cf. Merrill, supra note 51, at 981 (“If the Court were to commit to a strong theory of 
precedent in constitutional law, it would reduce the prospects for change through constitutional 
interpretation.”). 
 210.  See supra Part V.C. 
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precedent’s status as a component of the preexisting legal order that 
can guide judicial discretion and promote impersonality and continuity. 
Setting forth an exhaustive normative justification for any 
theory of constitutional construction is a complicated enterprise, and I 
do not purport to do so in this space. My aim for present purposes is 
merely to sketch the basic outline of such a justification by 
incorporating the earlier discussion of the conceptual overlap between 
precedent and originalism.211 Efforts to ground the originalist 
methodology in considerations of judicial constraint, stability, and 
impersonality can extend in large measure to the precedent fallback’s 
merits as a principle of constitutional construction.212 Like the 
Constitution’s original meaning, precedent has the power to constrain 
the judicial will.213 Like original meaning, precedent can infuse the 
legal system with a sense of stability and predictability, making legal 
change the province of the people—via the formal amendment process—
rather than the judiciary.214 And like original meaning, precedent can 
encourage a judge to subordinate her own preferences to overarching 
legal norms.215 Stare decisis facilitates the act of deferring to one’s 
predecessors on grounds that the court as an institution is something 
more than the court as an accumulation of individuals.216 Such 
deference is powerful proof that it is the rule of law, not the rule of men 
and women, that defines the liberties and obligations of persons. Of 
course, deference to precedent may not always carry the day; there are 
plausible reasons to conclude that the value of continuity will 
sometimes be overcome by the drawbacks of entrenching mistakes.217 
But a general presumption—even a rebuttable one—of deference to 
precedent can promote judicial impersonality where the Constitution’s 
original meaning is uncertain.218 
D. Beyond Constitutional Construction 
In defending the precedent fallback and recasting it as a 
principle of constitutional construction, I have addressed cases that 
satisfy two criteria: first, there is no clear conflict between precedent 
and the Constitution’s original meaning; and second, there are relevant 
 
 211.  See supra Part II.A. 
 212.  See supra Part II.A. 
 213.  See supra Part II.A. 
 214.  See supra Part II.A. 
 215.  See supra Part II.A. 
 216.  See supra Part II.A. 
 217.  See supra Part V.A. 
 218.  See supra Part V.A. 
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precedents on the books. What if those assumptions are relaxed? Does 
endorsement of the precedent fallback as a principle of construction 
imply anything about situations where precedent conflicts with the 
Constitution’s original meaning, or about the resolution of 
constitutional indeterminacy in cases of first impression? 
The answer to the former question, dealing with situations of 
conflict, was suggested above in Part III. In short, adopting a precedent 
fallback in cases of constitutional uncertainty does not have any 
necessary implications for cases in which the Constitution’s original 
meaning is clear. One might support a rigid approach that always, or 
nearly always, requires applying the Constitution’s clear meaning 
regardless of whether it conflicts with precedent. Alternatively, one 
might recognize various grounds for deferring to precedent even when 
the Constitution’s original meaning is clear.219 Either approach is 
consistent with deference to precedent in instances of constitutional 
uncertainty. 
As for cases of first impression: It is one thing to say that, for 
example, the “actual malice” rule of New York Times v. Sullivan220 
deserves deference as a valid construction made in response to 
constitutional indeterminacy.221 It is quite another thing to figure out 
how courts should respond to indeterminacy in the absence of binding 
precedent. For present purposes, the important point is that the 
precedent fallback does not require any particular approach to cases of 
first impression. It is true that, in order to maintain theoretical 
coherence with the precedent fallback, one’s treatment of cases of first 
impression should evince a comparable focus on promoting constraint, 
stability, and impersonality. Still, there are multiple approaches that 
could satisfy this requirement. A theory that requires deference to 
political action may constrain the judicial will.222 But an alternative 
approach that emphasizes the protection of individual liberty could also 
constrain judges if its directives were publicly accessible and 
articulated with precision. The precedent fallback is compatible with 
both of these—and other—options in cases of first impression. All that 
 
 219.  See supra Part IV.B. 
 220.  376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964):  
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that is, 
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not. 
 221.  Cf. Solum, supra note 164, at 516 (“[T]he rule of New York Times v. Sullivan is part of 
the legal content of constitutional doctrine, but it is not part of the communicative content of the 
text of the First Amendment.”). 
 222.  See supra Part II.A. 
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is required is that one’s theory of construction in the absence of relevant 
precedent meshes with an overarching commitment to a stable and 
impersonal rule of law. 
E. Acknowledging the Case Against Construction 
The division of constitutional adjudication into discrete steps of 
interpretation and construction is a controversial proposition. Some 
commentators criticize the interpretation-construction distinction as 
insufficiently attentive to Founding Era understandings regarding the 
proper response to linguistic indeterminacy. They contend that judges 
must respect not only original understandings about the meaning of 
constitutional text but also original understandings about how judges 
should proceed when linguistic meaning is uncertain.223 The resulting 
theory is one of “original methods originalism.”224 
The core of this argument is that the Constitution’s original 
meaning encompasses its original “interpretive rules.”225 If it was 
understood at the time of ratification that judges would resolve 
apparent ambiguities by selecting whichever meaning “was supported 
by the stronger evidence,” the need for judicial construction would be 
diminished.226 The province of construction would be limited even 
further if there was a Founding Era understanding that linguistic 
uncertainty should be resolved by upholding the validity of political 
action through “defer[ence] to the legislature’s interpretation.”227 The 
basic idea is that the Constitution comes packaged with its own 
troubleshooting manual, so judges should resist the urge to engage the 
machinery of constitutional construction at the first sign of complexity. 
A related claim is that the move to construction often occurs without 
proper appreciation of the fact that what appears to be “abstract 
meaning” will “turn out to have either a concrete or a general meaning 
that is not abstract.”228 
In response, some proponents of the interpretation-construction 
distinction argue that the Constitution’s original meaning does not 
include interpretive assumptions that lack textual footing. According to 
 
 223.  See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 141 (“[T]he constructionist claim that 
ambiguity and vagueness necessarily cause the original meaning to run out is untrue. There can 
be background interpretive rules that provide sufficient resources for resolving ambiguity and 
vagueness.”). 
 224.  Id. at 116. 
 225.  Id. at 128–29. 
 226.  Id. at 143. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 739. 
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Professor Barnett, “[w]hen a supermajority ‘approves’ a constitution, 
they are not adopting as law their own private intentions or 
assumptions, or those of others. Rather, they are adopting a text that 
has an objective public meaning.”229 Construction-minded originalists 
also contend that many interpretive assumptions are best understood 
as “canons of construction” that “determine legal effect and not 
linguistic meaning.”230 
With respect to the precedent fallback, the stakes of this debate 
relate not to the fallback’s validity but to the number of cases in which 
it will apply. For those who defend the interpretation-construction 
distinction and assert that the Constitution’s linguistic meaning is 
separable from extratextual assumptions about how linguistic 
indeterminacy should be resolved, the precedent fallback will have a 
relatively wide domain. For those who emphasize the relevance of 
original interpretive rules for resolving linguistic indeterminacy, the 
construction zone will be smaller.231 
But the difference between the two approaches takes on a 
different complexion against the backdrop of history. There is reason to 
believe that deference to precedent was itself a recognized interpretive 
method from the time of the Founding.232 James Madison wrote that 
the meaning of the law can be “liquidated and ascertained by a series 
of particular discussions and adjudications.”233 Caleb Nelson has 
characterized Madison’s writings and other contemporaneous sources 
as evincing an understanding that “[o]nce the meaning of an ambiguous 
provision had been ‘liquidate[d]’ by a sufficiently deliberate course of 
legislative or judicial decisions, future actors were generally bound to 
accept the settled interpretation even if they would have chosen a 
 
 229.  Barnett, supra note 40, at 659; see also Barnett, supra note 165, at 69 (“Originalism is 
not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out.”).  
 230.  Solum, supra note 17, at 510. 
 231.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 742 (“It is possible that a constitutional 
provision that contains abstract language is best understood as having an abstract meaning that 
allows future decision makers significant power to define its meaning.”). 
 232.  I am assuming, arguendo, that the original meaning of the Constitution’s text does not 
provide a clear account of the proper role of precedent. If that assumption is incorrect, deference 
to precedent might be better characterized as grounded in constitutional text rather than original 
interpretive methods. Cf. Strang, supra note 3, at 452 (“By the time of the Ratification, the 
Framers and Ratifiers understood judicial power to include stare decisis: judges must give 
significant respect to prior analogous cases and must give significant reasons for overruling 
precedents.”). 
 233.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison); see also Nelson, supra note 48, at 13 
(“Madison’s idea of ‘liquidation’ is . . . [that] [t]he interpreter gets to pick a particular interpretation 
from within a range of possibilities, but the interpreter is not at liberty to go beyond that range.”).  
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different one as an original matter.”234 According to Professor Nelson, 
that obligation was relaxed when “a prior construction went beyond the 
range of indeterminacy.”235 Precedent thus became a tool for limiting 
“the discretion that legal indeterminacy would otherwise give 
judges.”236 The result was to “ ‘fix’ the meaning of provisions that were 
indeterminate when they emerged from the Philadelphia 
Convention.”237 Critics of the interpretation-construction distinction 
have likewise acknowledged that around the time of the Founding, “it 
was sometimes claimed that unclear provisions would be liquidated or 
clarified over time through a series of reasonable judicial 
interpretations”238—a practice resembling the precedent fallback.239 
Understood in this way, the precedent fallback is not only a theory of 
constitutional construction with a basis in normative reasoning but also 
an original interpretive method with a basis in historical practice.240 
Yet there is an additional layer of complexity regarding the role 
of precedent in liquidating constitutional meaning. On one hand, it may 
be that the Constitution itself “instruct[s] future interpreters to honor 
settled liquidations of its indeterminacies” because the document was 
understood “not only to define a range of permissible interpretations, 
but also to delegate power to the provision’s initial interpreters to make 
 
 234.  Nelson, supra note 48, at 12; see also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent 
Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811 (2013) (“[P]ost-ratification practice can serve to give 
concrete meaning to a constitutional provision even if it was vague as an original matter.”); 
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist 
Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 665–66 (1999) (“[I]n Madison’s view, a precedent that is thought to 
expound or interpret the law or the Constitution is worthy of deference, but once the precedent 
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.”); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 941 (1985) (“[F]or 
Madison there could be no return to the unadorned text from interpretations that had received the 
approbation of the people.”). 
 235.  Nelson, supra note 48, at 14; see also id. at 11 (“Written laws, then, would have a range 
of indeterminacy. Madison and his contemporaries believed that precedents would operate within 
this range.”). 
 236.  Id. at 8. 
 237.  See Nelson, supra note 5, at 583. 
 238.  McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 760; see also id. (“This would fix the meaning 
and obligate future courts to follow the meaning.”). 
 239.  See Nelson, supra note 5, at 550 n.136 (discussing the interpretation-construction 
distinction and asserting that “[f]or members of the founding generation . . . settled ‘liquidations’ 
of the Constitution’s meaning . . . helped to define the law that courts and other actors were obliged 
to follow”); Nelson, supra note 48, at 83–84 (arguing that, with respect to judicial choices among 
plausible interpretations, “it is perfectly sensible for courts to apply a rebuttable presumption 
against overruling precedents”). 
 240.  See Nelson, supra note 5, at 549–50; cf. Barnett, supra note 79, at 269 (“When we cannot 
tell whether a term meant X or Y when it was enacted, early practice favoring X over Y might be 
an interpretive convention that clarifies original meaning in a manner that is compatible with the 
normative case for originalism.”). 
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an authoritative selection within that range.”241 On the other hand, 
perhaps the Founding generation viewed constitutional liquidation as 
a facet of “so-called ‘general’ law” that was consistent with 
contemporary “custom and reason” but nonbinding on future 
generations.242 That latter view would mean that “present-day 
originalists are free to consider alternative approaches to the 
Constitution’s indeterminacies.”243 (It is also possible that there is no 
historical evidence sufficient to establish which of these two positions 
predominated.244) 
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, there is a basis for concluding 
that, at very least, reliance on precedent was a permissible response to 
linguistic indeterminacy at the time of the Founding.245 To be sure, 
some originalists contend that the response to indeterminacy must be 
based on Founding Era understandings rather than normative 
assessments. Thus, if it was understood that all cases of indeterminacy, 
or even a subset of those cases, would be resolved through application 
of an interpretive principle other than deference to precedent, that 
principle would have a superior claim to validity as an original 
interpretive method. But if deference to precedent was one of several 
legitimate tools for dealing with linguistic indeterminacy, the precedent 
fallback has an adequate historical footing. The fallback may not be 
required by history,246 but neither is it foreclosed. 
A focus on historical understandings may also have implications 
for the precedent fallback’s operational details. For example, 
characterizations of liquidation as occurring over a series of actions may 
suggest that judicial propositions warrant deference only after they 
have been applied and affirmed in multiple opinions.247 Such an 
understanding would affect the determination of when a precedent 
 
 241.  Nelson, supra note 5, at 551. 
 242.  Id. at 552; see also id. at 553 (suggesting that the view of liquidation as general law is 
“more plausible than the notion that members of the founding generation understood the 
Constitution itself to require adherence to settled liquidations”). 
 243.  Id. at 552–53. 
 244.  See id. at 553. 
 245.  See supra text accompanying notes 232–40; cf. Harrison, supra note 61, at 522 (arguing 
that “Americans at the time of the Framing expected courts generally to follow precedent,” but 
denying “that during the Framing era the idea of judicial power was thought logically to imply the 
creation of precedent”). 
 246.  Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 759–60 (citing evidence of “at least three 
approaches to resolving” constitutional uncertainty: “pick the interpretation that appears to be the 
most likely,” uphold legislation “if a reasonable interpretation of the [applicable constitutional] 
provision would allow the legislation,” and permit the Constitution to be “liquidated or clarified 
over time through a series of reasonable judicial interpretations”). 
 247.  Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 36 (“The reason people trusted a series of decisions more 
than an individual judge’s opinion was that the series reflected a collective judgment.”). 
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becomes binding for purposes of applying the precedent fallback. I 
contended above that the best approach is to treat individual opinions 
as entitled to deference, so as to minimize the risk of abrupt reversals 
that are closely associated with changes in judicial personnel.248 If, 
however, deference to a single precedent was not an original 
interpretive method of dealing with constitutional indeterminacy, this 
normative analysis would give way (for proponents of the original 
methods approach) to historical practice, and deference would flow only 
after an opinion was reaffirmed and converted into a line of 
jurisprudence over the course of time. 
It is also important to note Professor Nelson’s argument that 
liquidation could occur through the decisions of the political branches 
as well as the judiciary.249 To similar effect is the Supreme Court’s 
recent discussion of the recess appointments power, in which a majority 
of Justices made clear that “the longstanding ‘practice of the 
government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’ ”250 The 
phenomenon of constitutional liquidation through political practice 
raises two issues. The first is what value courts should give to political 
constructions in the absence of contrary judicial precedent. Adoption of 
the precedent fallback does not dictate any particular answer to that 
question. The precedent fallback deals with the respect that should be 
given to judicial precedents when they are relevant to the case at hand. 
It has no necessary implications for the validity of political 
constructions when the courts have not yet spoken.251 
The second issue raised by political constructions is whether 
they can trump contrary judicial constructions. Once again, those who 
urge a historical focus will answer the question by using historical 
evidence to determine which type of construction was paramount. By 
contrast, for those who believe that historical analysis is improper or 
insufficient for choosing between political and judicial constructions, 
the choice will depend on normative commitments. Commentators such 
 
 248.  See supra Part V. 
 249.  See Nelson, supra note 5, at 528–29 n.38:  
Some members of the founding generation . . . thought that the political branches (and, 
by extension, the people themselves) should have exclusive responsibility for settling 
the Constitution’s indeterminacies, and that courts should play no role in this 
process. . . . Other members of the founding generation favored a larger judicial role. 
 250.  Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (quoting 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also id. (“[The Court’s] precedents show that this Court has treated 
practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is 
subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”). 
 251.  The calculus may be different for those who emphasize original methods of responding 
to constitutional uncertainty; for them, the proper approach would depend on historical evidence 
about the validity of political constructions. 
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as Keith Whittington have prioritized political constructions over 
judicial ones for reasons related to popular sovereignty.252 I have 
suggested an alternative approach of prioritizing judicial precedent in 
order to promote impersonality and doctrinal stability.253 On the 
account that I have offered, judicial precedents should receive at least 
a presumption of deference notwithstanding the subsequent emergence 
of contrary legislative constructions. But the presumption need not be 
absolute, and among the factors relevant to its defeasibility may be the 
value of upholding political constructions.254 
VII. REMAINING CONCERNS 
The previous Parts examined the precedent fallback as an 
intrinsic component of originalist interpretation and as a principle of 
constitutional construction. In this Part, I discuss three lingering 
concerns that apply across both contexts. The first is that by deferring 
to originalist and nonoriginalist precedents alike, originalist judges 
may unintentionally contribute to the marginalization of originalist 
jurisprudence. The second question is that a norm of strong deference 
to precedent would give judges too much discretion to issue sweeping 
edicts on the understanding that subsequent courts must follow suit. 
The third relates to the difficulty of making the threshold 
determination whether evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning 
is clear enough to resolve a dispute without resort to the precedent 
fallback. 
A. The Ratchet Problem 
Imagine an originalist judge who is inclined to defer to 
precedents regardless of the style of reasoning they embody. The judge 
thinks it proper to follow precedents that reflect an attempt to discern 
the Constitution’s original meaning. But she also sees value in 
deferring, on stare decisis grounds, to precedents that treat the original 
meaning as subordinate to considerations such as policy and justice. 
Nevertheless, the judge worries that her contemporaries and successors 
 
 252.  See Strang, supra note 76, at 1785 (offering a “tentative conclusion” that “originalist 
precedent that constructs constitutional law is subject to defeasance by the elected branches”) ; 
Whittington, supra note 126, at 129 (“[M]any political actors may welcome the courts stepping in 
to construct constitutional meaning, resolve indeterminacies, and maintain consensual values in 
specific cases. The difficulty arises, however, when that process becomes less consensual and power 
and influence shifts into the courts.”). 
 253.  See supra Part V. 
 254.  See supra Part VI. 
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who embrace competing interpretive philosophies will not be so 
charitable in their treatment of precedent. Her specific concern is that 
even if originalists defer to precedents without regard to interpretive 
methodology, nonoriginalists will refuse to reciprocate. In the worst-
case (for originalists) scenario, the result would be what Professor 
Solum has called a “ratchet” effect through which originalist precedents 
are frequently overruled by nonoriginalists while nonoriginalist 
precedents are commonly reaffirmed by originalists.255 This danger may 
suggest that the precedent fallback should be reconsidered, at least 
insofar as it fails to distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist 
decisions. 
In assessing this concern, it is important to recognize that the 
precedent fallback applies only when there is no conflict between 
judicial precedent and the Constitution’s original meaning. The extent 
of the ratchet problem, by contrast, depends on the role of precedent 
when the Constitution’s meaning is clear. A judge might adopt a 
fallback rule of deference to precedent while concluding that all conflicts 
between precedent and original meaning should be resolved in favor of 
the latter. That approach would alleviate the ratchet problem because 
nonoriginalist precedents would never trump the Constitution’s 
discernible commands. Alternatively, the judge might conclude that, in 
some situations, even clear constitutional meaning should yield to 
contrary precedent. Whether such an approach would move 
constitutional jurisprudence away from originalism depends on the 
circumstances in which precedent could trump original meaning. 
Defining those circumstances, in turn, depends on the particular 
version of originalism that is being applied. Hence the discussion in 
Part III, above, which explained how different strands of originalism 
entail distinctive rules for when judicial precedents can legitimately 
displace the Constitution’s original meaning.256 
It is one’s view of the status of precedent when it conflicts with 
original meaning that determines the acuteness of the ratchet concern. 
If originalists uphold precedents that deviate from the Constitution’s 
original meaning in a wide array of situations, the originalist project 
may indeed find itself in jeopardy. If originalists instead choose to 
restrict the situations in which clear textual and historical evidence will 
yield to contrary case law, the Constitution’s original meaning will 
remain intact. In neither case does the precedent fallback exacerbate 
the ratchet problem. 
 
 255.  Cf. Solum, supra note 48, at 193 (“If formalists respect precedent and there are 
alternating periods of realism and formalism, then we have a ratchet.”). 
 256.  See supra Part III. 
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B. Constraint Tomorrow But Discretion Today? 
Using precedent to constrain later judges has implications for 
earlier ones. Asking judges to defer to prior opinions affords some 
degree of “lawmaking power” to their predecessors.257 This fact should 
give us pause. Perhaps the infusion of precedent with binding force 
simply reallocates discretion between the courts of the past and present, 
without any meaningful impact on the amount of discretion coursing 
through the judicial branch. Or perhaps the effect is even worse, 
inflating the lawmaking power of earlier judges beyond the 
countervailing reduction in the discretion of their successors. The 
severity of this problem depends on the issue of precedential scope—
that is, the universe of propositions for which a precedent is treated as 
binding authority.258 At the heart of the matter is the recognition that 
a judicial opinion can be relevant for (much) more than its narrow 
result. Drawing a line between the parts of an opinion that require 
deference and the parts that are dispensable is crucial to the allocation 
of judicial power across time.259 
Under a broad conception of precedential scope, courts must 
defer to a wide array of prior judicial statements, provided that the 
statements include indicia of deliberation rather than appearing as “by 
the way” asides.260 Such an approach can be highly constraining of later 
courts but also highly empowering of earlier ones. The alternative is to 
define precedents more narrowly, for instance, by deferring only to the 
core ruling that was necessary to resolve a particular dispute.261 That 
approach limits the power of earlier judges to imbue their declarations 
with forward-looking effect, but it also reduces the constraining force of 
precedent on future judges.262 And, of course, there are numerous 
options between these poles. 
 
 257.  Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1249, 1250 (2006). 
 258.  See Kozel, supra note 70, at 180–81 (defining the problem of precedential scope and 
distinguishing it from the problem of precedential strength). 
 259.  See id. at 181–82. 
 260.  See, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (drawing a distinction 
between “subordinate clause, negative pregnant, devoid-of-analysis, throw-away kind of dicta” and 
“well thought out, thoroughly reasoned, and carefully articulated analysis”). 
 261.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 787 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “the holding/dicta distinction demands that we consider binding only that 
which was necessary to resolve the question before the [Supreme] Court”), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003). 
 262.  See Kozel, supra note 70, at 204–11 (discussing the implications of theories of 
precedential scope for the degree to which judges are constrained). 
         
2015] PRECEDENT FALLBACK 155 
The precedent fallback does not demand any single theory of 
precedential scope. It does, however, imply certain baseline principles 
regarding the nature of the judicial role. In order to respect the 
pronouncements of their predecessors and reinforce the ideal of a 
unified court working across time, judges must not distort or 
marginalize prior resolutions of disputed legal questions.263 Nor may 
they seize upon immaterial factual distinctions. Instead, a judge should 
treat the rule of decision contained in a precedent “as a genuine legal 
norm to which the court that he belongs to has already committed 
itself.”264 It is that type of mindset that establishes a court as “an 
institution that decides cases on a general basis” rather than “an 
institutional environment in which individuals make particularized 
case-by-case determinations.”265 Moreover, it might well be that 
supplementary principles—such as the virtues of a restrained approach 
to judging that is conscious of the drawbacks of broad rulemaking—
should inform the creation of precedent in the first instance. This need 
for supplementation is unremarkable, for stare decisis does not work 
alone. It is part of a dynamic set of interpretive and institutional 
considerations that define the enterprise of constitutional adjudication. 
C. Defining Constitutional Clarity 
The precedent fallback applies when the Constitution’s original 
meaning is uncertain. A pivotal question is where the bar for 
constitutional certainty—or, in the common parlance of the 
interpretation-construction debate, constitutional determinacy—
should be set. If the Constitution’s original meaning is deemed to be 
uncertain whenever one interpretation is more likely than the others, 
the occasions for falling back on precedent will be relatively rare; the 
fallback rule’s operation would be limited to situations in which the 
evidence supporting multiple interpretations is equally compelling. If, 
by comparison, the original meaning is treated as controlling only when 
the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
interpretation is accurate, there will be frequent invocations of 
precedent as a response to constitutional uncertainty. As Gary Lawson 
has put it, “it does no good to have a methodology for interpreting a text 
unless one also knows when it is time to declare epistemological victory 
or defeat and move on.”266 
 
 263.  See id. at 188–90 (discussing instances in which the Supreme Court has marginalized 
“its past expressions by depicting them as peripheral or overbroad”). 
 264.  Waldron, supra note 31, at 23. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (1992). 
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The most important takeaway for present purposes is that the 
precedent fallback is compatible with either a low bar or a high bar for 
proving the Constitution’s original meaning. A judge can fall back on 
precedent in cases of constitutional uncertainty regardless of how the 
concept of uncertainty is defined. In addition, it may be appropriate to 
alter the operative standard for constitutional certainty depending on 
whether an issue is a matter of first impression. In grappling with a 
thorny constitutional question, a judge might be inclined to fall back on 
a long line of relevant precedents instead of applying—notwithstanding 
her substantial doubts about its correctness—the interpretation that 
she deems most likely. Yet in the absence of a relevant precedent, that 
same judge might conclude that the best course is to apply her 
understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning despite her 
concerns. Such an approach can enhance continuity by avoiding 
interpretive fluctuations when the proper interpretation of the 
Constitution is subject to reasonable dispute. 
Finally, it warrants reiterating that even when the 
Constitution’s original meaning is inadequate to dictate the result to a 
particular question, fidelity to original meaning will nevertheless 
demonstrate the implausibility of some interpretations. A judge who 
begins with an inquiry into original meaning will always be left with a 
narrowed set of choices.267 By selecting among the plausible options 
against the backdrop of deference to precedent, judges can minimize the 
dangers of individual discretion while preserving a primary 
commitment to the Constitution’s original meaning—wherever the bar 
for constitutional certainty is set. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Rather than defending or challenging originalism as a general 
matter, this Article has dealt with one particular aspect of the 
methodology: its handling of judicial precedent. I have tried to show 
that originalism does not suffer from an inherent inability to leverage 
the value of precedent. Through a fallback rule of deference to precedent 
in situations of constitutional uncertainty, originalism and judicial case 
law can work hand in hand. The legitimacy of such a fallback rule is 
important, I have claimed, because evaluating originalism depends in 
part on what happens when the Constitution’s text and context are 
insufficient to resolve a case. 
 
 267.  Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 4 (“[E]xternal sources of law will often be indeterminate 
and incomplete; they will leave considerable room for judicial discretion. But unless they are 
wholly indeterminate, they will still tend to produce some degree of consistency in judicial 
decisions.”). 
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Of course, originalists do not need to make room for judicial 
precedent in articulating their vision of the constitutional order. Yet 
they can be faithful to precedent while remaining consistent in their 
commitment to the Constitution’s text. Robert Bork once asserted that 
“those who adhere to a philosophy of original understanding are more 
likely to respect precedent than those who do not.”268 Though I will not 
speculate about whether his statement was (or is) correct as a 
descriptive matter, the statement is sound to the extent it suggests that 
concerns about continuity and stability motivate originalism and stare 
decisis alike. Reasonable minds may differ over the ultimate merits of 
originalism. But in evaluating originalism’s validity as an interpretive 




 268.  BORK, supra note 6, at 159. 
